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INTRODUCTION: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TAX CODE COMPLEXITY AND THE ROLE OF
COURTS N FORmULATING AND IMPLEMENTiNG TAX POLICY
Like Hamlet's vision of death as a peaceful end to the traumas of life,
tax simplification remains merely "a consummation [d]evoutly to be
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wisht."' Even though the Reagan administration's tax reform initiative,
which culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,2 was promoted as an
attempt at tax simplification,3 tax professionals are still distressed by the
complexity in our tax laws.4 This concern over complexity was clearly
evident at the historic Invitational Conference on Reduction of Income
Tax Complexity in Washington, D.C. in January, 1990. This Conference,
which was jointly sponsored by the American Bar Association ("ABA")
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"),
brought together approximately 250 prominent tax practitioners, acade-
mics, and government officials.5
Some participants charged that complexity arises, in part, from a
desire by Congressional and Treasury staffers to draft elaborate rules to
cover every contingency.6 This approach to the problem of complexity
has been termed a "technical" one and has been subjected to both praise
WLLIAm SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, so. 1.
2 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
Both the Treasury's proposals and President Reagan's proposal for tax reform
clearly indicated in their titles that they involved attempts at tax simplification. See U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFoRM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMLICIT, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH - TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1984), reprinted in
TREASURY REPORT ON TAX SIMLmFICATION AND REFORM, Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
Special #1: Nov. 29, 1984, Report #52, Extra Edition and in TREASURY REPORT ON TAX
SIMPLIFICATION AND REFORM, Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) Special #2: Dec. 6, 1984,
Report #53, Extra Edition; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESs,
SIMPLiCTY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH - VALUE-ADDED TAX, reprinted in TREASURY
REPORT ON TAX SIMPLIFICATION AND REFORM - VALUE-ADDED TAX, Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. (CCH) Special #3: Dec. 27, 1984, Report #56, Part I1; PRESIDENT REAGAN,
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND
SIMPLICTY, reprinted in Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) Special #4: May 29, 1985, Report
#25, Extra Edition.
' One example of this distress is evidenced by the fact that all articles in an issue
of the Tax Law Review honoring Professor James Eustice dealt with the problems of
complexity in the tax laws. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Dedication: James S. Eustice, 45
TAX L. REV. 1 (1989); James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45
TAX L. REv. 7 (1989); Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and Passive Actiity Limitations:
Can Complexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV. 97 (1989); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The
Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REv. 25 (1989); Deborah
H. Schenk, Foreward, 45 TAX. L. REv. 5 (1989); Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for
Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121 (1989). See also
John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification
in the Law of Taxation, 68 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1993).
' Lee A. Sheppard & Marianne Evans, Simplification Means Tough Choices,
AICPAIABA Conferees Agree, 46 TAX NOTES 381 (1990).
6 Id. at 382-83.
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and criticism in an article by Professor Edward Zelinsky.7 Using the
development of complex Code provisions dealing with qualified pension
and profit sharing plans as an example, Professor Zelinsky demonstrates
that cover-all-base complex provisions are not usually the result of pipe
dreams by staffers. Rather, they often arise after taxpayers have won
unintended benefits in court because the facts of their cases did not fall
squarely within the conduct proscribed by the then-existing specific, albeit
less complex, statutory provisions! Thus, hints Professor Zelinsky, it is
not fair to condemn drafters for merely closing a statutory loophole.'
Some tax policies, he asserts, require complex statutory provisions.1°
What we should do, he contends, is evaluate the complexities required to
pursue a particular policy and consider those complexities in determining
whether that policy should be pursued in the first place."
Professor Zelinsky's analysis is helpful in that it emphasizes that
debates over complexity cannot be divorced from overall policy analysis.
However, Professor Zelinsky's approach appears aimed more at reducing
the quantity of the complexity in the tax laws rather than at reducing the
quality or nature of that complexity. Despite Professor Zelinsky's
appropriate defense of hard-working Congressional and Treasury tax
specialists, the quality or nature of some complex tax provisions may in
fact arise from excessively detailed provisions placed in the tax laws by
drafters in an attempt to eliminate problems caused by uncertainty in the
law and the litigation that those problems spawn. Such a detail-driven
approach to drafting statutes in general, and tax statutes in particular, fails
to give due deference to the role of the courts in the formation of tax
policy. This, in turn, can lead to unfortunate results when the inevitable
problems that the statute drafters sought to avoid ultimately are confront-
ed by the court system. To reduce the nature, as well as the quantity, of
the complexity found in tax code provisions, we should consider not
simply the policy behind each proposed provision, but also the role of the
courts and the role of Congress in formulating and implementing tax
policy.
There is, of course, much literature in the field of statutory interpreta-
tion,12 and this Article will not attempt to re-examine it. That literature
7 Edward A. Zinsky, Another Look At Tax Law Simplicity, 47 TAX NOTES 1225
(1990).
Id. at 1226-27.
'Id.
1" Id. at 1227.
1n Id. at 1228.
'
2 See, e.g., REED DIcKERsoN, THE INTERPRETATIXON AND APUCATION OF STATUTES
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has already been re-examined in the context of interpreting tax statutes
in a superb article by Professor Lawrence Zelenak.'3 In an earlier article,
the author of this Article drew from both Professor Zelenak's article and
the views of Dean (now Judge) Guido Calabresi on the role of courts in
the age of statutes 4 to analyze the historical development of the annual
accounting concept in our income tax culture. 5 Dean Calabresi's position
is that courts have the common law power to invalidate statutes that have
become obsolete. 6 Although some may consider this a radical position, 7
Professor William Popkin apparently does not believe Dean Calabresi's
position to be radical enough.
In arguing for what he terms a "collaborative model of statutory
interpretation,"'" Professor Popkin criticizes what he terms the "legisla-
tive will" model of statutory interpretation. According to Popkin, the
legislative will model, which grants the judiciary the passive role of
determining a legislature's intent, 9 unrealistically ignores that members
of the judiciary cannot analyze legislative intent in a vacuum unaffected
by their own substantive political values." Thus, a model of statutory
interpretation is needed that does not confine deliberation about public
values to the legislature, but "include[s] a creative role for courts as they
(1975); JAMES W. HUIsT, DEAuNG WrrH STATUTES (1982); NORMAN J. SINGER,
SuEERIMD STATUTORY CONSTRUCION §§ 45.01 - 65.05 (5th ed. 1992); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HAaRV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
3 Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).
14 GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
1" Myron C. Grauer, Debunking the Myth of the Historic Supremacy of Annual
Accounting for Income Taxes: A Coalescence of Non-Literal Interpretation with Or'ginal
Intent Analysis, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 165 (1989).
'6 CA ABREsI, supra note 14, at 164 ("[The common law fimction to be exercised
by courts today ... is the judgmental function ... of deciding when a rule has come to
be sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it
can only stand if a current majoritarian or representative body reaflins it.").
17 Abner J. Mikva, The Shynng Sands of Legal Topography, 96 H.Av. L. REV. 534
(1982) (reviewing CALAasEsI, supra note 14); Joseph T. Sneed, The Art of Statutory
Interpretation, 62 TaX. L. REV. 665, 668 n.15 (1983); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 256-57
(1983).
"' William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988).
9Id. at 578.
20 Id. at 579.
[Vol. 84
INTERPRETATION OP "CAPITAL ASSETS"
engage in statutory interpretation."' To Popkin, Calabresi's approach is
too limiting and too much tied to the legislative will model because
"Calabresi still appears to believe that legislative intent is what courts
seek when determining the meaning of statutes, with judicial choice
relegated to the special task of dealing with obsolete statutes." Popkin,
on the other hand, supports a more activist role for the judiciary with the
following synopsis of his position:
The only strong claim made by the collaborative model is that law,
not just legislation, is the product of public deliberation, which is an
ongoing political process of identifying political values. Legislation is,
therefore, tentative and questioning, not willful, and legislative equilibria
are unstable, leaving open the possibility of revision. Rather than being
an emanation from legislative will, a statute is better understood as a
political event which enters into the law, to be interpreted by the courts.
Because law, not just statutes, is the product of public deliberation about
political values, courts must play a normative role when they interpret
and apply the law?
This Article will not try to resolve the debate over the proper role for
a court in dealing with a statutory provision or what model a court should
use in determining what its role is. Rather, this Article will draw from
that debate to suggest that if Congress were to recognize the value of
granting courts a collaborative role in the implementation of tax policy,
tax statutes could be drafted in a somewhat less detailed and thus less
complex manner and court opinions interpreting them could be far more
principled.
Approximately thirty-five years ago Professor Ernest Brown wrote:
I am sure that the draftsmanship of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
followed a pattern designed to minimize the chance of judicial
interpolation, and to increase predictability. ... I think its method is
both unsound and self-defeating ... because the very intricacy of the
statute obscures both direction and limits designed to be imposed. I
believe a statute, even a tax statute, can set forth the shape of its
commands with relative clarity, and indicate the elements to be taken
into account in applying them. I am confident that an attempt to
2 Id.
2 Id. at 580.
21 Id. at 590.
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
dispense with the need for responsible administration by the executive
and judicial branches of the Government will be self-defeating.& '
Professor Brown reached this conclusion in part because "the multifari-
ousness of the transactions to which tax statutes must relate '  makes it
highly unlikely that drafters of tax statutes will be able to anticipate and
draft for every transaction that a tax planner could devise 6
Although Professor Brown would most likely eschew Professor
Popkin's radical view of the role of the judiciary,27 a similar theme runs
through their thinking. Professor Popkin sees legislation as "tentative and
questioning,"'28 thus justiuing a collaborative role for courts in the
development of the law. He reasons that legislation is "tentative and
questioning" because all law, regardless of its source, "is the product of
public deliberation, which is an ongoing political process of identifying
political values."' Because of this ongoing political process, a legisla-
ture cannot anticipate all future events which may come in contact with
a particular statute. Thus, under the collaborative model, courts can keep
the political process in motion by interpreting statutes in a manner
consistent with the changing political topography. Similarly, Professor
Brown recognizes that the drafters of tax statutes cannot anticipate every
' Ernest 3. Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REV.
235, 251 (1961).
21 Id. at 240.
26Id.
27 Brown states:
There are, indeed, some who would... tell us that it is naive to think that
Congress has collective will, that no statute has an intrinsic meaning and that
ultimately the statute means what the judges say it means. They might admit
that the shape of the statute emerging from the judicial process is different from
its shape as it emerges from Congress, but they would say that this means only
that the judges have taken an inert form and have given it shape by giving it
life and effectiveness, and that this is the essence of the judicial function and
process. Dissatisfaction with the shape which has emerged they would often
diagnose only as unhappiness over the result of specific decisions.
Those who thus dismiss our problem have mistaken cynicism for sophistica-
tion, and judicial power for the judicial function. Whatever his role may be in
the realm of constitutional dispute, the judge holding office for life must
certainly approach the application ofstatutes by subordinating both his will and
his views to the representative Congress, and must expend his energies in
applying his understanding to that task
Id. at 235-36 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
2 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
2' See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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transaction that a tax planner could create." However, unlike Professor
Popkin, he does not espouse a broad collaborative role for courts in all
events." Rather, he urges that tax statutes be drafted in a manner'that
would enable the judiciary to play a collaborative role in the development
of tax law without resorting to a model of statutory interpretation that is
as radical as Professor Popkin's. 2 If such drafting were to occur, courts
would neither be forced to engage in "slavish literalism ... [n]or, what
is more likely ... , decisions which simply brush aside elaborate
formulations in favor of what the individual judge, rightly or wrongly,
senses to be the operative force of the statute"33 in cases not specifically
covered by the statute. Professor Brown apparently would eschew
Professor Zelinsky's surrender to the inevitability of complexity in some
Code provisions.'
Professor Brown's admonitions are as relevant today, as we seek to
deal with the growing complexity in the Internal Revenue Code, as they
were thirty-five years ago. Lest there be any doubt, an examination of the
Supreme Court's treatment of one issue relative to a particular Code
section should, unfortunately, prove Professor Brown to be correct. That
section is § 1221,"s which defines "capital asset," and ironically it is not
all that complex. It simply provides:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means
property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade
or business), but does not include -
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind
which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer
if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the
'0 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
" Compare supra note 23 and accompanying text with supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
Brown, supra note 24, at 251.
Compare Zelinsky's statement, "There is, however, no reason to view the
complexity of sections 414(m), 414(n), and 414(o) and their regulations as a failure of
technical skill or desire. Indeed, those who drafted these provisions have generally
implemented the underlying policy as well as could be expected," Zelinsky, supra note
7, at 1227 with Brown's statement, "Let me be content here simply to cite developments
under Sections 302, 306, 341 and 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as indicating
that intricate formulation will defeat its own ends. ... I believe a statute, even a tax
statute, can set forth the shape of its commands with relative clarity, and indicate the
elements to be taken into account in applying them." Brown, supra note 24, at 251.
" I.R.C. § 1221 (West Supp. 1995).
1995-96]
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taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which
is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167,
or real property used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a
letter or memorandum, or similar property, held by -
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such
property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar
property, a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or
produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property
is determined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or
exchange, in whole or part by reference to the basis of such
property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph
(A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course
of trade or business for services rendered or from the sale of
property described in paragraph (1);
(5) a publication of the United States Government (including
the Congressional Record) which is received from the United States
Government or any agency thereof, other than by purchase at the
price at which it is offered for sale to the public, and which is held
by -
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publica-
tion is determined, for purposes of determining gain from a
sale or exchange, in whole or in part by reference to the basis
of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in
subparagraph (A).36
Nonetheless, two Supreme Court opinions, Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Commissioner37 and Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,38 demon-
strate how this section, which on its face appears to cover all contingen-
cies, led the Supreme Court to engage in what Professor Brown feared
3Id.
37 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
31 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
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most, both slavish literalism and a brushing aside of formulations to reach
what the Court rightly sensed to be the correct result."
In the past much has been written about the Corn Products case and
the doctrine that it spawned.4" More recently, much has been written
about the Arkansas Best decision and its effects on the Corn Products
doctrine.4' A few of these articles42 have even noted in passing what
Professor Stanley Surrey noted as far back as 1956, namely, that
Congress' technical approach to defining "capital asset" has led to the
problems evident in both of these opinions.43 No article, however, has
"' See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., 2 BORIs I. BrrrKEn, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 51.10.3, at 51-61 to 51-69 (1981) (discussing ordinary business operations and
the Corn Products Doctrine); George B. Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains and
Losses - The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 TAXEs 770 (1974); Joel Kauffman, A Second
Look at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXES 605, 606-07 (1963); Thomas J. Korge,
When Corporate Stock Is Not a Capital Asset: Corn Products Revisited, 64 A.B.A. J. 1925
(1978); William P. Battaglia, Project, Section 741 and Corn Products: A Logical
Extension?, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 90 (1978); Gary S. Davis, Note, The Corn Products
Doctrine and Its Application to Partnership Interests, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 341 (1979);
Lars G. Gustafsson, Note, A Holding Company's Stock in a Subsidiary: A Capital or
Ordinay Asset?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1045 (1987); Deborah F. Marson, Note, The
Impact of Corn Products: Twenty-Three Years Later, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 869 (1978);
Lance J. Miller, Note, The Unpleasant Taste of Corn Products, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 311
(1979); Tommy Womack, Note, Evolution of the Capital Asset Classification of Properly
Purchased as an Incident to Business: The Broadening Spectrum of Corn Products, 2
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 335 (1972).
41 See, e.g., Jesse V. Boyles, The Supreme Court Kills the Corn Products Doc-
trine - But Will It Rest in Peace?, 66 TAXES 723 (1988); Kenneth P. Brewer, "Best"
Facts Make Bad Law: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Recent Decision in
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 TAX NOTES 403 (1988); Virginia L. Briggs &
H. Ward Classen, Arkansas Best.: A Return to the Reasoning of Corn Products, 44 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1229 (1987); Edward D. Kleinbard & Suzanne F. Greenberg, Business
Hedges After Arkansas Best, 43 TAX L. REV. 393 (1988); Edward J. Schnee & Michael
L. Roberts, The Arkansas Best Decision: The Supreme Court Severely Restricts the Corn
Products Doctrine, 19 TAX ADvism 813 (1988); Hans-Dieter Sprohge, Some Legislative
Implications of the History of the Judicial Interpretation of Section 1221, 6 AKRON TAX
J. 79 (1989); Wesley Yang, Impact of Arkansas Best on Some Types of Investments
Remains Uncertain, 70 J. TAx'N 106 (1989); M. Kevin Bryant, Comment, The Corn
Products Doctrine After Arkansas Best, 14 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REV. 131 (1989); Richard
D. Puetz, Note, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner: A Strict Interpretation of LR.C.
§ 1221 and a Narrowing of Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 174 (1989); David P. Tolman, Note, The Arkansas Best Decision: Taking Corn
Products off the Taxpayer Menu, 8 VA. TAX REV. 705 (1989).
42 See Boyles, supra note 41, at 734-35; Sprohge, supra note 41, at 96-98.
4' See Stanley S. Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HAIV.
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yet engaged in a detailed analysis of the Corn Products and Arkansas
Best cases in the context of the morphogenesis of § 1221. This Article
will attempt to do so in the hope of demonstrating the jurisprudential
problems that can result from tax statutes that attempt to cover all
contingencies.
This Article will not enter the current debate as to whether capital
gains should receive preferential treatment. It will thus not advocate the
formulation of a new definition of "capital asset." The purpose of this
Article is much more modest. It is simply to use § 1221 of the Code and
the Corn Products and Arkansas Best opinions in a case study of what
happens when Congress drafts too narrowly to indicate a collaborative
role for the judiciary in the development of tax law.4' In the process,
L. REV. 985, 995-96, 998 (1956).
4 Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to comment briefly on why this Article
focuses on a collaborative role for the judiciary in the development of tax law and does
not discuss the collaborative role of the Treasury. Professor Brown, of course, did allude
to the need for a collaborative role for the executive branch (the Treasury) as well as for
a collaborative role for the judiciary. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, Louis Eisenstein, some fifty years ago, explained why he preferred
administrative construction of a tax statute by the Treasury to judicial construction of a
tax statute. See Louis Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration,
58 HAR V. L. REV. 477, 536 (1945). Eisenstein believed that because the Treasury is
constantly exposed to tax complexities, it is better qualified than the judiciary to
administer the tax laws. Id. at 526. Indeed, Eisenstein believed that if the Treasury did
its job properly, it could deal with technicalities, and Congress could "concentrate more
upon fundamental policy considerations ... [rather than spend] ... valuable time with
endless detail." Id. at 539.
Although the recent promulgation of the partnership Anti-abuse rule, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.701-2 (1994), may represent a sea change on the part of the Treasury, it appears that
for the most part the Treasury has been a part of the problem of complexity, not part of
the solution. Zelinsky notes that it is not just I.R.C. §§ 414(m), 414(n) and 414(o) that
are complex; the regulations pursuant to them are also complex. See supra note 34.
Additionally, participants at the January, 1990 ABA/AICPA Conference on Tax
Complexity, blamed Treasury as well as Congressional staffers for drafting complex
provisions. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. That the Treasury has been a part
of the complexity problem should not be surprising. Treasury staffers are only human.
They can no more anticipate the multifarious transactions that tax planners can devise
than can Congressional staffers who specialize in the tax area. When they try to anticipate
those transactions and draft for every contingency, they merely add complexity, albeit in
a format other than a Congressional enactment. Because they cannot anticipate every
transaction, there will always be interstices and a key role for the judiciary to play.
Therefore, this Article focuses on the collaborative role of the judiciary. The less rigidly
statutes (and to some extent regulations) are drawn, the better the judiciary can play its
collaborative role without committing the two sins of slavish literalism and disregard of
elaborate formulation to reach the operative force of the statute. See supra notes 30-33
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this Article will indicate how § 1221 could have been better drafted to
effectuate what historically appear to be Congress' evident purposes, but
it will not make any judgment on the propriety of Congress' intentions or
goals in drafting § 1221 in the first place. Although it deals on one level
with the definition of "capital asset," the real purpose of this Article is to
focus attention on a problem of tax code complexity that could perhaps
be alleviated by statutory drafting that indicates a more collaborative role
for the judiciary in the formulation and implementation of tax policy.4
The Article shall proceed in the following manner. Part I will
describe and analyze the Corn Products case itself.4 Part II will discuss
the Corn Products doctrine.47 Part III will describe and analyze the
Arkansas Best case.4 Part IV will examine the history of § 1221 and
relate it to what the Court did in the Corn Products and Arkansas Best
cases 9 Finally, the Article will conclude with some thoughts on the
tension between the desire for certainty in the tax code and the problems
and accompanying text.
For an article advocating less detailed complexity in Treasury Regulations so that the
judiciary can play a collaborative role in the development of tax law much in the same
way as this Article advocates statutory drafting to enable the judiciary to play a
collaborative role in the development of tax law, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reflections
on the Regulations Process: 'Do the Regulations Have to Be Complex" or "s Hyperlexis
the Manna of the Tax Bar," 51 TAX Norms 1441 (1991). Like Professor McMahon, the
author is less than sympathetic to "Henny Penny" cries from the tax bar that the sky will
fall if the Code and Regulations fail to provide clear answers to every potential
transaction one could imagine. See infra notes 281-91 and accompanying text.
4' At first blush it may appear ironic or even inappropriate that an article on Code
complexity would focus on the definition of "capital asset' without addressing the merits
or demerits of granting preferential treatment to capital gains. It is, of course, well-
recognized that preferential treatment for capital gains causes great complexity in our tax
laws. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-l.pe or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1135 (1974); Daniel I. Halperin, Why Not the Best? Retain
Equal Treatment of Capital and Ordinary Income, (Letter), 48 TAX NoTES 368 (1990).
But the complexity caused by preferential treatment for capital gains is transactional
complexity. The type of complexity that we are dealing with in this Article is not
trmsactional complexity, but rather complexity in the drafting of statutory provisions
themselves. It is, therefore, not inappropriate to examine the problem of statutory
complexity without addressing the problem of transactional complexity. It may, however,
be ironic that this study of statutory complexity is well-served by examining a Code
provision that has led to much transactional complexity.
See infra notes 51-81 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 82-112 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-63 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 164-248 and accompanying text.
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that can result from denying courts a more collaborative role in the
development of tax law.5"
I. TIM CoRN PRODUCTS CASE
The Corn Products Refining Company manufactured various products
from corn, such as starch, syrup, and sugar."1 It sold these products at
prices established in contracts with its customers. However, Corn
Products' corn storage facilities were so small that it could not keep on
hand a sufficient supply of corn to fill all the orders it had outstanding
for delivery of its products. As a result, it was forced to buy additional
corn to fill its orders well after the contract prices for those orders had
been agreed upon. If the price of corn rose after the contract price for the
corn product had been agreed to, Corn Products' cost of production would
rise and its profit on the transaction would drop commensurately. To
protect itself against such an increase in corn prices, Corn Products began
a policy of purchasing corn futures contracts so as to place a ceiling on
the price that it would have to pay for the corn needed to fill its
production contracts. If the price of corn on the spot market rose, Corn
Products could either take delivery of the corn at the lower futures
contract price or pay more for corn on the spot market and sell its futures
contracts at a profit. Of course, if the spot market price for corn at the
time for delivery was lower than that called for in the futures contract,
Corn Products would buy the corn on the spot market and sell its futures
contracts at a loss. Corn Products initially reported its gains and losses
from its transactions in futures contracts as ordinary income and loss, but
apparently later amended its returns for the years in question, claiming
that the corn futures transactions should receive capital gain or loss
treatment.52 By reporting the transactions as capital and by selling the
So See infra notes 249-91 and accompanying text.
', The Supreme Court decision in Corn Froducts represented the culmination and
consolidation of several cases in the Tax Court involving the Corn Products Refining
Company. The citations to the reported cases are: Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner,
16 T.C. 395 (1951), 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (1952), supplemented by 20 T.C. 503 (1953),
aff'd in part and review dismissed in part, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S.
46 (1955). Regarding the Second Circuit's partial affrmance and partial dismissal of
review, the partial dismissal of review was with respect to an issue not relevant to the
subject of this Article. Thus, for purposes of this Article, the Second Circuit can be
viewed as affirming the holding of the Tax Court. The description in the text of this
Article of the facts in Corn Products represents a distillation of the facts presented in all
the reported opinions.
£2 See Corn Products, 16 T.C. at 398; Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 515.
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futures contracts at a profit when the price of corn rose, Corn Products
could convert ordinary income into capital gain. Its increased costs of
production caused by purchasing corn at the higher spot market price
reduced its profits from the production and sale of corn products, but this
reduction in profits was counterbalanced by the gain realized from the
sale of the corn futures contracts."
The Commissioner challenged Corn Products' assertions that its
dealings in corn futures contracts were capital transactions and the Tax
Court agreed with the Commissioner.' In holding that the corn futures
transactions were not capital, the Tax Court noted: "The corn futures
contracts were not subject to depreciation and were not included in
inventory. 55 Thus, the Tax Court described the corn futures contracts
in a manner that precluded them from falling outside the literal definition
of "capital asset."5 The Tax Court, however, stated: "Petitioner's
Although it does not appear from these two opinions that the taxpayer's change of
position initiated the tax dispute, it should be noted at this early stage of the Article that,
in other cases, the absence of such a change in reporting position could well preclude the
IRS from challenging a taxpayer's treatment of a similar gain as capital in nature. As
futures contracts, like stocks and other securities, are ordinarily held for investment and
are thus capital in nature, it would take an extremely sharp auditor to dispute the capital
treatment of a gain from their sale. See infra note 81. In fact, the Court inArkansas Best
stated:
Because stock is most naturally viewed as a capital asset, the Internal Revenue
Service would be hard pressed to challenge a taxpayer's claim that stock was
acquired as an investment and that a gain arising from the sale of such stock
was therefore a capital gain. Indeed, we are unaware of a single decision that
has applied the business-motive test so as to require a taxpayer to report a gain
from the sale of stock as an ordinary gain.
485 U.S. at 222-23. As we shall see, this inability of the IRS to police taxpayer reporting
in this area was a contributing factor to the decision in that case.
n See WUAM A. KLEiN Er AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON 842-43 (7th ed.
1987).
' Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951), 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 721
(1952), supplemented by 20 T.C. 503 (1953), aff'din part and review dismissed in part,
215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
" 11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 723.
According to the Supreme Court opinion in Corn Products the statutory definition
of "capital assets" in effect for the tax years in question read as follows:
(1) CAPITAL ASSETS. - The term "capital assets' means property held
by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in
the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for
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purchases of corn futures did not constitute speculative transactions for
profit, but were consummated in order to obtain business protection and
to insure the profitable conduct of its business."'57 The Tax Court then
added, "[I]t seems indisputable ... that petitioner's practice of purchasing
corn futures was an integral part of its manufacturing business. It would
hence be anomalous to view them as purely speculative transactions of
a capital nature ... ."" With this language the Tax Court used a policy-
oriented rationale to deny capital asset treatment to the com futures
contracts and more or less ignored the language in the statutory definition
of "capital asset."
The Tax Court need not, however, have taken this approach. The
Second Circuit managed to affirm the Tax Court's decision by finding the
corn futures contracts to be within the statutorily provided inventory
exception to the definition of "capital asset." The appeals court stated:
In United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, the
Supreme Court set forth three general classifications of dealings in
commodity futures: speculation, legitimate capital transactions, and
hedging. These classifications have since been adopted as convenient
nominal guides by the courts to determine the proper tax consequences
of futures transactions. Where futures are dealt with for the purposes of
speculation or what is called legitimate capital transactions, they
obviously fall outside the possibly relevant exclusions of Section 117(a).
In the hedge, however, the property is used in such a manner as to
come within the exclusions, for it is a part of the inventory purchase
system which is utilized solely for the purpose of stabilizing inventory
cost. It is an integral part of the productive process in which the
property is held not for investment but for the protection of profit with
the intent of disposition when that purpose has been achieved. As such
it cannot reasonably be separated from the inventory items and the cost
(or profit) from such operations would necessarily be entered in the
books of account of the business as part of cost of goods sold. The tax
treatment of hedges, then, is not a "Yudge-made exception" to Section
depreciation provided in section 23(1); ....
350 U.S. at 49 n.6 (quoting § 117(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). Except for
a different cross reference because the 1939 Code, which was then in effect; differed in
section numbering from the 1954 and 1986 Codes, this language is identical to that found
in current Code § 1221(1) and all but the last phrase of current Code § 1221(2). See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 724.
58 Id. at 726 (citations omitted).
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11 7(a); it is simply a recognition by the courts that property used in
hedging transactions properly comes within the exclusions of the
section.59
The Second Circuit then continued:
The futures transactions of this petitioner, it is true, did not
constitute what is known as "true" hedging. The true hedge can occur
only when forward sales prices are fixed and the relation between
commodity purchase and later sales price is insured against both
increase and decrease of commodity prices. As the forward sales prices
here were based mainly on the lower of order or market prices, the
petitioner was protected only against increases in commodity prices and
did not have the complete insurance of the tre hedge. But this is a
distinction presently of no significance. The property here was used for
essentially the same purpose and in the same manner as in true hedging.
Therefore, for the same reasons that the true hedge is not accorded
capital treatment under Section 117(a), the kind of transactions with
which we are now concerned are not to be regarded as capital ones
either.6
°
Although the Second Circuit's view of "inventory" was somewhat
expansive,6 its interpretation of the definitional statute reached a sound
policy result without abandoning or ignoring the governing statutory
language.' Furthermore, the Second Circuit said no more than was
needed to decide the case before it. Had the Supreme Court been in a
frame of mind to decide only the case before it, it could simply have
affirmed on the basis of the Second Circuit's opinion.
Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 1954) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
6'Id.
"Kauffman, supra note 40, at 606-07.
Several commentators have also noted that the Supreme Court could have reached
the result that it did by similarly finding the corn futures contracts to fit within the
statute's inventory exception. See BrrrxER, supra note 40, 51.10.3, at 51-62 to 51-63;
MARvIN A. CHimmTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 17.02, at 286-87 (4th ed. 1985)
[hereinafter CHmRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION]; Marvin A. Chirelstein, Capital
Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income Tax Treatment of Contract
Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1964) [hereinafter Chirelstein, Contract
Termination Payments]; Zelenak, supra note 13, at 644-45.
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Apparently, however, as one commentator has noted: "[lit was the
Court's intention to use this case as a vehicle for a judicial pronounce-
ment that would have far wider application than the facts here present-
ed."'63 The Court recognized, of course, that it could not legitimately
ignore the fact that § 117 of the 1939 Code defined "capital asset" to be
property with only certain enumerated exceptions.' Thus the Court stated:
"Nor can we find support for petitioner's contention that hedging is not
within the exclusions of § 117(a),"' 5 and concluded its opinion with the
statement, "We believe that the statute clearly refutes the contention of
Corn Products."" In fact, the government placed great emphasis upon
these two sentences in its brief in the Arkansas Best case to support its
contention that the Court in Corn Products merely affirmed the Second
Circuit's holding that the corn futures in question fell within the
statutorily provided inventory exception and did not create any new
exception to the definition of "capital asset."' However, immediately
after stating, "Nor can we find support for petitioner's contention that
hedging is not within the exclusions of § 117(a)," the Court continued:
Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the literal
language of the exclusions set out in that section. They were not stock
in trade, actual inventory, property held for sale to customers or
depreciable property used in a trade or business. But the capital-asset
provision of § 117 must not be so broadly applied as to defeat rather
than further the purpose of Congress. Congress intended that profits and
losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be considered
as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss. The
preferential treatment provided by § 117 applies to transactions in
property which are not the normal source of business income. It was
intended "to relieve the taxpayer from ... excessive tax burdens on
gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove
the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions." Since this
section is an exception from the normal tax requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code, the definition of a capital asset must be narrowly
Kauffman, supra note 40, at 607. See also Chirelstein, Contract Termination
Payments, supra note 62, at 41.
' See supra note 56 (quoting the Corn Products' Court's presentation of the
applicable statutory language).
65 Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 51.
6 Id. at 53.
' See Brief for the Respondent at 25-35, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485
U.S. 212 (1988) (No. 86-751).
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applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly. This is necessary to
effectuate the basic congressional purpose. This Court has always
construed narrowly the term "capital assets" in § 117."
As a result, the Supreme Court opinion cannot be read as merely
affirming the Second Circuit's holding that the corn futures exception fell
within the statutorily provided inventory exception. The Court's clear
statement that the corn futures did not come within the literal language
of the statutory exclusions and were not inventory refutes any such
contention.
How then can we explain the Court's statements that hedging was
within the exclusions from the capital asset definition and that the statute
clearly refuted Corn Products' contention?69 Apparently the Court
viewed the specific statutory exceptions from the definition of "capital
asset" as exemplifying an overarching Congressional purpose, namely, to
exclude from the capital asset concept transactions involving the everyday
operations of a business. Indeed, what could be more exempletive of
everyday business operations than gains and losses from sales of
inventory or stock in trade? To read the statute literally, however, and to
exclude from capital asset treatment only those assets falling within the
categories specifically listed in the statute might thwart the policies that
the statute was trying to promote. Thus, in saying that the statute clearly
refuted Corn Products' contention that hedging was not within the
statutory exclusions, the Court merely meant that the statutory exclusions
evidenced such a strong policy against granting capital asset treatment to
everyday business operations that despite the literal language of the
statute, the everyday business transactions in the case before it must fall
within the statutory exception from capital asset treatment.
7
The Supreme Court's opinion in Corn Products has been criticized by
such highly respected tax law professors as Stanley Surrey,1 Ernest
- Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 51-52 (quoting Bumet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106
(1932)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 65 and 66.
70 Indeed, the Government, at the time of Corn Products, encouraged the Court to
read the statute in this manner. See Brief for the Respondent at 18, Corn Prod. Ref. Co.
v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) ("The congressional purpose in granting special tax
preference to gains from, and of limiting the deductions of losses on, the sale or exchange
of capital assets must be gleaned from the exceptions enumerated in the statute .... .").
71 See Surrey, supra note 43, at 993 (accusing the Court of "placing the congression-
al definition of section 1221 gently to one side and then deciding the case on its own
concept of the capital gain - ordinary income division between investment and business").
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Brown,72  Marvin Chirelstein, 73  and Boris Bittker.74  Although one
additional commentator did criticize the opinion for attributing to
Congress an overall intent that could not be divined from the legislative
histories,75 the bulk of the criticism has been directed at the unnecessary
nature of the Court's approach.76 Even a commentator who advocates
non-literal interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code has joined in this
criticism.' Corn Products, to him, involved the unnecessary use of non-
literal interpretation.' The same result could have been reached by a
literal reading of the statute through an approach akin to that of the
Second Circuit."
By emphasizing the policy behind the definition of "capital asset"
rather than the narrow language in the statutory definition, the Court
legitimated other efforts in other fact patterns to deny capital asset status
to property transactions that were integrally related to the everyday
operations of a taxpayer's business. Because many of these transactions
resulted in losses and because capital asset treatment is detrimental to the
taxpayer in a loss situation,"0 the Corn Products doctrine that assets
7 See Brown, supra note 24, at 249 ("[W]e have seen the Court, in an entirely
unnecessary opinion, shake loose from the mooring of the statute in Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Commissioner.").
73 See CmEsT , FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 62, 17.02, at 283-87
(noting that perhaps the Corn Products Court could have reached the same result (and
avoided the motive test that it spawned) on the narrower ground that these corn futures
contracts fit within the inventory exception to the statutory definition of a capital asset).
' See Brrrn , supra note 40, 51.10.3, at 51-62 to 51-63 (commenting that the
Court could have achieved the same result by removing these futures contracts from
capital asset treatment through the statutorily provided inventory exception to the scope
of the definition of a capital asset).
71 Stephen T. Dean, Capital Gain and Ordinwy Income -Problems in Transmuta-
tion, 24 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1291, 1301 & n.35 (1966).
76 See supra notes 71-74.
77 See Zelenak, supra note 13, at 644-47.
71 Id. at 644.
7' Id. at 645 (though not noting the Second Circuit's opinion in Corn Products).
" I.R.C. § 1211 reads as follows:
SEC. 1211. LIMITATION ON CAPITAL LOSSES.
[Sec. 1211(a)]
(a) CORPORATIONS. - In the case of a corporation, losses from sales or
exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of gains
from such sales or exchanges.
[See. 1211 (b)]
(b) OTHER TAXPAYERS. - In the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be
allowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus
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integrally related to a business' everyday operations were not capital in
nature became a tool in the hands of the taxpayers and a revenue drain
on the Treasury." The next section of this Article will briefly relate the
development of the Corn Products doctrine.
IL ThE CoRN PRODUcTs DocTINE
At the outset it should be noted that Corn Products was not the first
time that capital asset treatment was denied to assets that would ordinarily
fall within the literal definition of "capital asset."' In General Counsel
Memorandum ("G.C.M.") 17322,s' the Internal Revenue Service held
that hedging transactions in cotton futures by a cotton textile manufactur-
er were not dealings in capital assets. In reaching its decision in Corn
Products, the Court noted the existence of this G.C.M. and its consistent
(if such losses exceed such gains) the lower of -
(1) $3,000 ($1,500 in the case of a married individual filing a
separate return), or
(2) the excess of such losses over such gains.
1.C. § 1211 (West Supp. 1995). Although I.R.C. § 1212 provides for a carryforward of
any disallowed or unused capital losses, the limitation in § 1211 on the immediate use of
capital losses in excess of capital gains makes the characterization of a loss as capital
detrimental to the taxpayer because the use of non-capital losses is not similarly limited.
The limitation on the recognition of net capital losses is a long-standing one. For a
synopsis of its history, see Sanford M. Guerin, Capital Gain and Loss Tax Policy -
Economic Substance or Legalistic Form?, 1985 ARIz. ST. L.1 905, 915-18.
"l Professor Chirelstein has probably best explained the use of the Corn Products
doctrine to the benefit of taxpayers and the detriment of the Treasury in the following
manner:
Tihe Corn Products "rule" is available to taxpayers as well as the government;
it is a "rule of law" which applies to gains and losses alike. Not surprisingly,
therefore, ... many of the litigated cases involving an application of the Corn
Products doctrine are cases in which the security or other asset is disposed of
at a loss. Asserting that the property was acquired for business rather than
investment-related reasons, the taxpayer reports the loss as a deduction from
ordinary income. When the very same property appreciates, on the other hand,
the taxpayer is likely to find that investment motives were predominant and to
report his profit as a capital gain. ... [Then] only a very sharp-eyed revenue
agent would be likely to [think] of challenging it. Hence, ironically, the Corn
Products doctrine has served chiefly as a justification for ordinary loss
deductions; only occasionally has it produced ordinary treatment on the gain
side.
CHMELST , FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 62, 17.02, at 285-86.
2 A graduate tax student at the University of Florida also noted this fact. See
Battaglia, supra note 40, at 108-10.
' 15-2 C.B. 151 (1936).
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application by courts and the Commissioner.' Furthermore, the Court
noted that Congress had apparently acquiesced in this tax treatment.85
Unlike the rationale of Corn Products, however, the rationale of the
G.C.M. did not address whether the futures contracts fit the statutory
definition of capital asset or whether the futures transactions were
integrally related to the taxpayer's everyday business operations. Rather,
the Service viewed the losses incurred on the futures transactions as fully
deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses for the cost of
insurance against cotton market fluctuations.86
In Western Wine and Liquor Co. v. Commissioner,s7 the taxpayer, a
wholesale liquor distributor, found itself, due to World War II, unable to
obtain an adequate supply of liquor to meet its customers' demands. It
learned, however, that American Distilling Company planned, on a one-
time basis, to grant dividends to its shareholders in the form of substantial
quantities of liquor. In order to obtain the liquor, the taxpayer purchased
substantial amounts of American Distilling stock. As soon as it received
its liquor dividend, the taxpayer then sold the American Distilling stock
at a loss. The IRS claimed the loss was capital, while the taxpayer,
naturally, wanted to treat the loss as ordinary, alleging that it represented
part of the cost of acquiring the whiskey which it held for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. The Tax Court held for the
taxpayer by looking to the substance rather than the form of the
transaction.' Although there was language in the opinion to the effect
that the stock was not purchased for investment and its sale was "an
incident of the business,"'89 the Tax Court did try to bring the stock into
a statutorily provided exception to the definition of capital asset. The Tax
Court stated:
Since the stock was not acquired as an investment or for any
purpose other than as a means of acquiring the whiskey, and it was sold
as promptly as possible in the ordinary course of business after this
purpose was accomplished, it was property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business and was not a capital
asset9
" Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52-53.
'Id. at 53.
86 15-2 C.B. at 152.
87 18-T.C. 1090 (1952), appeal dismissed on Commissioner's motion 205 F.2d 420
(Sthr Cir. 1953).
g 18 T.C. at 1096-97.
19Id. at 1099.
90Id.
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Although the result in Western Wine was compelling from a policy
perspective,9 ' the attempt to justify the result by reference to the statutory
exception for property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business does not withstand scrutiny. By the time of Western
Wine, the Second Circuit had already affirmed a Tax Court decision that
this statutory exception to capital asset treatment was applicable to
securities only if sold by a taxpayer "regularly engaged in the purchase
of securities at wholesale."' The taxpayer in Western Wine, however,
was regularly engaged in the purchase of liquor, not securities, at
wholesale, and the securities in Western Wine were not purchased at
wholesale. Thus, the attempt to bring Western Wine's security transac-
tions into a statutory exception from the definition of capital asset was
weak indeed.
After Western Wine, and just prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Corn Products, the Second Circuit decided Commissioner v. Bagley &
Sewall Co.93 There the taxpayer, a manufacturing concern, was forced to
post U.S. Government bonds as a performance bond for a contract. The
taxpayer purchased the bonds, deposited them as security, and performed
its contract. As soon as the contract was completed, the bonds were
released to the taxpayer who immediately sold them at a loss. In holding
for the taxpayer and treating the loss as ordinary, the Second Circuit
made no attempt to fit the bonds within a statutorily provided exception
to the definition of capital asset. Instead, it merely held that the loss on
the bonds was fully deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense because "the purchase and sale of these bonds was merely an
incident in the carrying on by petitioner of its regular business." 4
These three examples, perhaps, explain why the Court in Corn
Products framed its opinion more broadly than did the Second Circuit in
Corn Products. Corn Products involved hedging through futures
contracts, as did the G.C.M. promulgated almost twenty years earlier. As
a result, it was quite appropriate for the Court to refer to that G.C.M. and
to note that Congress had acquiesced in its interpretation. However, by
the time of Corn Products, fact patterns, not involving hedging or futures
91 Indeed, even the Government, in requesting the Court in Arkansas Best to reject
the "Corn Products doctrine" and cases such as Western Wine, conceded the reasonable-
ness of the result in Western Wine. Brief for the Respondent at 45-46 n.27, Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988) (No. 86-751).
' Van Suetendael v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 987, 993 (1944), aff'd, 152
F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added).
221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
94Id. at 946.
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contracts, had developed in which capital asset treatment could be
justifiably denied even though the assets involved could not possibly fit
within any of the statutorily provided exceptions to the definition of
"capital asset."95 If the Court in Corn Products had denied capital asset
status to the hedging futures before it on the same narrow grounds as had
the Second Circuit, the legitimacy of the approaches in Western Wine and
Bagley & Sewall would have remained in limbo. With Corn Products, the
Court had the opportunity to place its stamp of approval on the results in
Western Wine and Bagley & Sewall. It, therefore, took the opportunity to
do so. While its sweeping opinion may have been unnecessary to decide
the case before it, the sweeping opinion indeed was necessary, in order
for the Court to place its imprimatur on a developing area of the tax law
in as efficient a manner as possible.96 Furthermore, it cannot be doubted
that in so doing the Court recognized that taxpayers would be the prime
beneficiaries of its opinion. In all of the preceding cases it was the
taxpayer, in a loss situation, arguing for the approach that the Court
affirmed.
As a result of the Corn Products opinion, courts could no longer
determine the capital or ordinary nature of an asset merely by looking at
the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the definition of capital asset.
Rather, they were forced to consider whether the transaction involving the
particular asset was integrally related to the taxpayer's everyday business
operations and whether the taxpayer was motivated to acquire the asset
for everyday business as opposed to investment purposes.' As motive is
somewhat difficult to determine, the results in the cases were not always
consistent." Furthermore, because under certain circumstances, almost
For an additional example of a pre-Corn Products case in which capital asset
status was not bestowed upon assets that fit within the statutory definition of "capital
asset," see Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1146 (1955) (loss
on debentures purchased to ensure source of supply of plywood and not for investment
purposes not treated as a capital loss).
"Indeed, it should be noted that the Court was encouraged by the Government to
take the sweeping approach that it did. The Government's brief did not attempt to defend
the approach of the Second Circuit. Rather, the Government conceded that the futures
contracts did not fall within the statutory exceptions to the definition of "capital asset."
Brief for the Respondent at 27, Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46
(1955). Instead, the Government emphasized that the futures transactions were integrally
related to the taxpayer's everyday business operation. Id. at 11-12, 27-28, 33. Furthermore,
the Government made the Court aware of the scope of the issues emerging in the capital
asset definitional area by directly referring to the Western Wine and Bagley & Sewall
cases in its brief. See id. at 22.
SCHIREsTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 62, 17.02, at 283-84.
"See generally Miller, supra note 40.
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any type of asset or transaction can be deemed integrally related to one's
everyday business operations, the doctrine was applied in a myriad of
circumstances. The story of the varied applications of the doctrine,
however, has been recounted many other times" and thus need not be
repeated here in any great detail.
The most striking feature of the doctrine's application, however, was
that it could be used to preclude capital asset treatment in an ever-
expanding set of circumstances. One commentator, back in 1974,"°
categorized the circumstances in which capital asset treatment would be
precluded (from narrowest to broadest) in the following manner:
1. Where the taxpayer's motive is to accomplish a result normally
achieved by a deductible expense.1"'
2. Where the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring the asset is to acquire
an underlying non-capital asset."0
3. Where the taxpayer's motive is to protect his ordinary business
income 03
4. Where the taxpayer's motive is to acquire a new business whose
operations are integrally related to or can be integrated into the
taxpayer's pre-existing business operations.1 4
By the time the Arkansas Best case came to the Court, the doctrine's
application had expanded so greatly that a Fifth Circuit decision permitted
"See, e.g., BrTKER, supra note 40, 51.10.3, at 51-61 to 51-69; Javaras, supra note
40; Kauffman, supra note 40; Korge, supra note 40; Battaglia, supra note 40; Davis,
supra note 40; Marson, supra note 40; Miller, supra note 40; Womack, supra note 40.
" Javaras, supra note 40.
101 This category would cover Western Wine's stock purchase to obtain whiskey via
a dividend. See supra text accompanying notes 87-92; see also Booth Newspapers, Inc.
v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 922 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (stock in a paper company pur-
chased and held by a newspaper publisher only so long as was necessary to assure it of
an adequate supply of newsprint during a paper shortage held not to be a capital
asset).
" This category would cover stock purchased solely to obtain non-capital assets held
by the corporation whose stock was purchased. See John I Grier Co. v. United States,
328 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1964).
1 This category would cover stock purchased solely to protect one's employment
relationship with the corporation whose stock was purchased. See Steadran v.
Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1970).
104 This category would include the purchase of a subsidiary- whose ,operations can
benefit the existing operations of the parent. See Schlumberger Technology Corp. v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1971).
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ordinary loss treatment even when a taxpayer admitted that it had initially
agreed to purchase the corporate stock in question as an investment.'
In some respects this expansive application was encouraged by
positions initially taken by the government. For example, in the late
1960s the government took the position that the Corn Products doctrine
overrode the specific language of § 12311"' and precluded capital gain
treatment for depreciable property that was integrally related to the
taxpayer's everyday business operations. 7 However, given the difficul-
"I See Campbell-Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984). In that
case, by the time the agreement to purchase the stock in question was about to close, the
taxpayer realized that the transaction was imprudent from a financial standpoint. The
taxpayer did not believe that it was legally obligated to complete the stock purchase, but
did so anyway to protect its goodwill and reputation as a business that kept its word.
Because expenditures to protect goodwill are treated as ordinary deductions, the Fifth
Circuit permitted ordinary loss treatment when the stock purchased under these
circumstances was sold. Not even a clear holding by the Tax Court in W.W. Windle Co.
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694, 712 (1976), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 550
F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1977) "that stock purchased with a substantial investment purpose is a
capital asset even if there is a more substantial business motive for the purchase" could
deter the Fifth Circuit. It simply concluded that by the time of the purchase, the
motivation to go through with the deal was solely business in nature. 744 F.2d at 459 &
n.54.
1- I.R.C. § 1231 (West Supp. 1995).
107 See Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 665
(E.D. La. 1968) where the court rejected the government's attempt to apply Corn Products
to § 1231 property with the following language:
The government's reliance on Corn Products is confusing from the
beginning, for, unlike the property involved in the Corn Products case, the tools
in question here are excluded from the definition of "capital assets" by the
express language of § 1221 itself. Here, there is simply no necessity for the
application of the Corn Products doctrine, since the express language of
§ 1221(2) excludes these tools from the capital-asset definition. The tools in
question, by the express terms of § 1221, are not capital assets in the first
place.
We must reject the government's contention that the Corn Products case
operates to exclude these tools, admittedly not capital assets under the express
definition of that term in § 1221, from coverage under the provisions of § 1231.
Section 1231 refers to the very class of property excluded from the definition
of capital-asset by § 1221(2) and, with certain qualifications, allows gains from
sales or involuntary conversions of such property to be treated, or, to use the
exact language of the statute, "considered as gains... from sales or exchanges
of capital assets." ... [W]e would have great difficulty in applying the Corn
Products doctrine to exclude the tools in question here from the capital-asset
treatment granted by § 1231 for the reason that, through § 1231, "Congress has
said, in effect, that even though property used in the trade or business is not a
capital asset, we are to treat it as a capital asset."
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ty of policing taxpayer compliance in Corn Products doctrine cases and
considering that the doctrine gave the taxpayer the upper hand,' not
surprisingly, the government began to retreat from its position favoring
broad application of the doctrine. By the late 1970s the government was
successfully contending that Corn Products did not apply to the sale of
partnership interests because § 741 specifically provided capital treatment
for those transactions. 9 By the mid-1980s, the government had reached
the conclusion that the Corn Products doctrine was misbegotten" and
saw the Arkansas Best case as an opportunity to eliminate the doctrine
from tax jurisprudence. It, therefore, did not oppose the taxpayer's petition
for certiorari in Arkansas Best". for a review of an Eighth Circuit
decision that rejected the Corn Products doctrine.' This Article will now
examine the Arkansas Best case in some detail to determine the sound-
ness of the Court's opinion and the motivation behind it.
IL THE ARKANS BEsT CASE
Arkansas Best Corporation ("Arkansas Best") was aholding company
which grew out of the diversification and expansion of a trucking compa-
ny." Eventually the holding company owned 100% of the stock of five
separate subsidiaries, two of which were in the insurance field, one of
279 F. Supp. at 665 (quoting I.R.C. § 1231(a)) (emphasis in Deltfide) (citation omitted).
But see Hollywood Baseball Ass'nv. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 848 (1970) (applying Corn Products to § 1231 property - in that case, minor
league baseball player contracts whose sale on demand to a major league team constituted
an integral part of the minor league teams business operations).
1. See supra note 81.
109 See Pollack v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 142, 145 (1977). Ironically, the position
taken by the government in Pollack was very similar to the position taken by the district
court in Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools in rejecting a government attempt to apply Corn
Products to § 1231 property. See supra note 107. The positions of the taxpayer and the
government had thus shifted 180 degrees with respect to how and when the Corn
Products doctrine should be applied.
110 See Brief for the Respondent at 26, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485
U.S. 212 (1988) (No. 86-751).
... See Brief for the Respondent (in response to taxpayer's Petition For Writ of
Certiorari) at 8-9, 14, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988) (No.
86-751).
" Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), qff'd, 485
U.S. 212 (1988).
" The most detailed exposition of the facts in the case can be found in the opinion
of the Tax Court, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640 (1984), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
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which was in the computer field, one of which was in the furniture
business, one of which was in the tire business, and one of which was in
its initial line of business, trucking. All five subsidiaries interacted with
one another in a synergistic relationship. For example, the trucking
company transported the furniture for the furniture company, obtained
tires from the tire company, was insured by the insurance companies and
had its billings handled through the computer company.
14
In 1968, Arkansas Best acquired approximately sixty-five percent of
the outstanding stock of the National Bank of Commerce which was
located in Dallas, Texas. The Bank did not interact with Arkansas Best's
other subsidiaries as those other subsidiaries did with each other and was
acquired mainly for the positive effect it could have on financial
statements that Arkansas Best was preparing in connection with a public
offering of its stock.'15 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
in 1970, however, caused Arkansas Best to decide to divest itself of the
Bank stock by 1981.116 Then, beginning in 1972, the Bank began to
experience serious financial problems."' To bolster the Bank's finances
and to obtain the resignation of the Bank's president Arkansas Best made
further capital contributions to the Bank and purchased from the Bank
president his personal holdings in the Bank's stock."' Only after
making these additional acquisitions of Bank stock did Arkansas Best
begin to sell its Bank stock holdings. The sales resulted in a loss which
Arkansas Best characterized as ordinary, pursuant to the Corn Products
doctrine."
9
With respect to the Bank stock purchased through 1972, the Tax
Court held that the loss on the sale of that stock was capital 2 In
reaching this decision, the Tax Court was influenced by the fact that the
Bank did not interact with the other Arkansas Best holdings in a
synergistic manner similar to the way in which the other holdings
interacted with each other. Thus, as the Bank did not operate as an
114 83 T.C. at 642-43.
"I Id. at 644-45.
..6 Id. at 645-46.
11 Id. at 647.
118 Id. at 657. It might be noted that the Tax Court indicates that the Bank president's
stock was acquired after 1972, while the Eighth Circuit opinion indicates that it was
acquired during 1972. See 800 F.2d at 217. As the date is immaterial and as the Tax
Court treated the sale of this block of stock in the same manner as it did the sale of all
other post-1972 acquisitions, the Bank president's stock shall be discussed in the text as
if it were definitely acquired after 1972.
9 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 214.
120 Arkansas Best, 83 T.C. at 655.
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integral and necessary part of Arkansas Best's holdings' everyday
business operations, the Bank stock purchased through 1972 must have
been acquired for investment purposes.'
With respect to the Bank stock purchased after 1972, however, the
Tax Court held that the loss on the sale was ordinary." In reaching this
conclusion the Tax Court stated:
. Owning a controlling interest in a bank - a highly regulated,
peculiarly public institution - imposed a special responsibility on
Arkansas Best. After 1972, Arkansas Best acquired additional shares of
NBC stock to meet this obligation and protect its own business
reputation.
As a growing conglomerate, Arkansas Best depended upon its good
reputation with creditors in order to assure a reliable source of financing
for acquisitions. In addition, Arkansas Best's reputation as a conglomer-
ate especially skilled in management determined its standing with other
businessmen and in the stock market. (Arkansas Best was listed on the
American Stock Exchange beginning in 1969 and on the New York
Stock Exchange beginning in 1972.) Association with the failure of a
bank would have severely blemished Arkansas Best's reputation in the
financial and business communities in which it operated.
Moreover, the demise of the bank would have exposed Arkansas
Best (as the controlling shareholder) to potentially damaging and costly
litigation by minority shareholders.
Expenditures to preserve business reputation are typically currently
deductible business expenses. The purchase of stock may be a necessary
tactic in the protection of business reputation, and, in certain narrow
circumstances, may invoke the doctrine of Corn Products.
Arkansas Best was not compelled to make purchases of NBC stock
after 1972 nor could it have been motivated by the prospect of obtaining
a profitable return on its purchases."z
The IRS successfully appealed to the Eighth Circuit the decision of the
Tax Court insofar as it allowed ordinary loss treatment on sales of Bank
stock acquired after 1972."ss
One can certainly question whether the Tax Court should have
applied Corn Products so as to allow ordinary loss treatment on the sale
1 Id.
1 Id. at 656-57.
1 Id. at 656 (citation omitted).
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215, 216 (8th Cir. 1986).
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of the Bank stock acquired after 1972. As already noted,"5 in so applying
Corn Products, the Tax Court characterized the post-1972 acquisitions as
expenditures to preserve Arkansas Best's business reputation. Thus, the
Tax Court characterized these expenditures as falling within the narrowest
category of the Corn Products cases - expenditures intended to accom-
plish a result normally achieved by a deductible expense." However, as
the Tax Court had clearly noted that Arkansas Best did not operate the
Bank as an integral part of its pre-existing business, '27 these expenditures
could just as easily have been characterized as falling beyond even one
of the broadest fact patterns to which Corn Products
applied - expenditures to acquire a new business whose operations are
integrally related to the taxpayer's pre-existing businesses.' Indeed,
two factors indicate that it would have been more appropriate for the Tax
Court to have treated the post-1972 acquisitions as part and parcel of an
acquisition process that fell beyond what could properly be the broadest
application of the Corn Products doctrine.
First, the Tax Court did note that as late as 1974, Arkansas Best
hoped to sell its Bank stock at a gain and hoped for capital gain treatment
on the sale."5 Thus, the post-1972 acquisitions must have been made with
some expectation or hope of obtaining the gain that can result from
accepting the risks of a capital investment. As a result, Corn Products
should not have been applied to treat any of the stock sold as non-capital
in nature.13'
Second, although arguably the post-1972 acquisitions may have been
made to preserve or maintain the business reputation of Arkansas Best,
the need to maintain that reputation arose out of (and was merely
incidental to) an investment that was not integrally related to the everyday
operations of Arkansas Best's pre-existing businesses. Once the Tax Court
found that the motivation behind the initial acquisition of any National
Bank of Commerce stock fell outside the ambit of the Corn Products
doctrine, the Tax Court could have held that the subsequent stock
purchases to obtain the resignation of the Bank's president were made
simply to preserve and further Arkansas Best's investment in the Bank.
12 See supra text accompanying note 123.
' See supra text accompanying notes 100 & 101.
127 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 100 & 104.
"' Arkansas Best, 83 T.C. at 647.
1'o For an excellent article espousing the view that capital asset treatment should be
applied to "gain[s] accruing due to risk' but not to "gain[s] accruing due to the mere
passage of time," see William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 153, 155 (1983).
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By granting ordinary loss treatment under Corn Products to those
subsequent purchases and sales of the Bank stock, the Tax Court went
beyond even the questionable result in Campbell-Taggart.' In that case,
the Fifth Circuit permitted ordinary loss treatment on the sale of stock
because by the time of the initial stock purchase, the taxpayer's motive
had purportedly changed from being of an investment nature to that of
preserving its business reputationm In Arkansas Best the Tax Court
extended the holding in Campbell-Taggart by examining each stock
purchase separately so that the sale of one block of stock could obtain
ordinary loss treatment even though there was still an investment motive
when the initial block of stock was actually purchased.' Based on these
factors the Eighth Circuit could have reversed the Tax Court in Arkansas
Best and limited ordinary loss treatment to those circumstances where
there was no longer any investment motive present at the time of the
initial stock acquisition.
" See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
I( One could argue that the Tax Court in Arkansas Best was not really extending the
holding in Campbell-Taggart by examining each stock purchase separately because the
stock in Campbell-Taggart was ostensibly also purchased in a two-step transaction, and
the government urged that each step of the transaction be examined separately. See
Campbell-Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442, 445 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984). However,
the district court opinion in Campbel-Taggart strongly intimates that even by the time
of the first step in the two-step transaction, Campbell-Taggart's motivation for the
purchase had changed from being of an investment nature to that of protecting its business
reputation. See Campbell-Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 355, 357 (N.D. Tex.
1982), aff'd, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that at "[a]bout the same time as" the
first tep in the transaction occurred, it was apparent that the financial condition of the
company whose stock Campbell-Taggart was acquiring had so significantly deteriorated
that Campbell-Taggart might not have been legally obligated to carry out the purchase).
Furthemore, because the first step in the purchase transaction occurred merely to satisfy
some concerns that the Spanish government might have, and not because of any United
States tax consequences, the district court in Campbell-Taggart effectively 'Ignored" the
first step of the transaction, Campbell-Taggart, 552 F. Supp. at 357, and appears to have
treated the stock purchase as transpiring for U.S. tax purposes only upon consummation
of the second step of the transaction. Id. Perhaps for this reason, the government
abandoned on appeal its argument that each step of the transaction be examined
separately. Campbell-Taggart, 744 F.2d at 445 n.5. Because the government abandoned
its argument in Campbell-Taggart that each step of the transaction be examined
separately, the Fifth Circuit in Campbell-Taggart did not in fact examine separate stock
purchases separately. Thus, the Tax Court inArkansas Best was extending the holding in
Campbell-Taggart by separately examining the sales of blocks of stock that were not
purchased at the same time.
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The foregoing analysis does not, of course, present a brightline test
for the scope of the Corn Products doctrine that could be applied to any
fact pattern that could arise. It merely tells how the Eighth Circuit could
have reversed the Tax Court's application of the Corn Products doctrine
without questioning the legitimacy of the doctrine itself, but to describe
the Eighth Circuit's opinion as merely questioning the legitimacy of the
Corn Products doctrine would be understating what occurred. It would
be far more accurate to say that the Eighth Circuit attempted to gut the
Corn Products doctrine of any viability, and the Supreme Court followed
suit.
The Eighth Circuit's assault on the Corn Products doctrine began by
looking to the literal language of § 1221 of the CodeM and concluding
that capital stock clearly did not fall within any of the last four statuto-
ry exceptions from the broad definition of "capital asset.""13 The court
then considered whether the Bank stock could be treated as an ordinary
asset under the first statutory exception which treats: stock in trade,
property properly included in inventory if on hand at the end of the
taxable year, and property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business as non-capital assets. The Eighth Circuit
found this exception inapplicable to Arkansas Best's ownership of the
Bank stock because, "Generally, capital stock would meet this exception
only if the taxpayer's business consisted of dealing in securities."' 36
Thus, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the inventory/stock in trade exception
quite narrowly and concluded: "[T]he Bank stock was a capital asset
because it does not fall into one of the statutory exceptions." 37
By implying, however, that capital stock could fall within the
inventory/stock in trade exception only if the taxpayer was a securities
dealer, the Eighth Circuit did more than just give a narrow literal reading
to § 1221. It also strongly intimated that it would not have granted
ordinary loss treatment to the taxpayers in Western Wine and Booth
Newspapers38 even though those taxpayers' stock acquisitions were just
as integrally related to their inventory requirements as the corn futures
acquisitions in Corn Products were to Corn Products' inventory. Indeed,
the Eighth Circuit then went on to reject the Corn Products doctrine
when it stated:
1 See supra text accompanying note 36.
"s Arkansas Best, 800 F.2d at 218.
36 I.
137 Id.
See supra note 101.
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We do not read Corn Products as either requiring or permitting the
courts to decide that capital stock can be anything other than a capital
asset under section 1221. It seems to us that one of the last places
where the legal system deliberately should foster subjectivity and
uncertainty is in the tax code. Corn Products and its progeny, which we
respectfully view as misbegotten, have done precisely that, leading to
increased recourse to the administrative and judicial processes to resolve
conflicting contentions about taxpayers' motivations in purchasing
capital stock. Congress could have written section 1221 to incorporate
some sort of exception regarding capital stock, just as it recognized the
unique position of securities dealers in 26 U.S.C. § 1236, but it did not
do so. 39
The court claimed that the Eight Circuit had "declined all previous
invitations to extend Corn Products beyond its facts" 4' and further
implied that Supreme Court precedent supported its view that the Corn
Products doctrine was "misbegotten."'4
The Eighth Circuit looked to the 1972 Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp.'42 and stated:
In Mississippi Chemical, the Supreme Court based its characterization
of capital stock as a capital asset solely on the language of section
1221, and ignored its previous decision in Corn Products entirely ....
The Supreme Court held that since the stock was "of value in more than
one taxable year, it is a capital asset within the meaning of § 1221 of
the Internal Revenue Code, and its cost is non-deductible.' 43
Although the Court in Mississippi Chemical did state, "Since the security
is of value in more than one taxable year, it is a capital asset within the
meaning of § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code ... .,"' the Court
did not base that determination on the language of § 1221 as the Eighth
Circuit asserted. Rather, the Court looked to the policies behind the
establishment of the "Banks for Cooperatives" pursuant to the Farm
Credit Act of 1933 to determine whether the cost of acquiring certain
stock in one of those Banks was a currently deductible expenditure.
45
"" Arkansas Best, 800 F.2d at 221 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 219.
'4' Id. at 221.
142 405 U.S. 298 (1972).
' Arkansas Best, 800 F.2d at 219-20.
'" Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. at 310.
'4' Id. at 302-11.
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Indeed, because the issue in Mississippi Chemical was how to treat
the acquisition costs of certain stock, not how to treat the gain or loss
realized on the disposition of that stock, it is unfortunate that the Court
in Mississippi Chemical ever indicated that the issue might involve
whether the stock in question was a capital asset under § 1221. The true
issue was whether the expenditure in that case was for any type of asset,
the cost of which would have to be capitalized, not whether the asset, if
there were any, was capital or non-capital. As a result, the Corn Products
doctrine was totally irrelevant to the disposition of the issues in Mississp-
pi Chemical. It is for that reason and that reason alone that the Court in
Mississippi Chemical ignored the Corn Products doctrine. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit's attempt to justify its rejection of the Corn Products
doctrine through Supreme Court case law that developed after the Corn
Products case does not withstand close scrutiny.
Not surprisingly, the brief for Arkansas Best in the Supreme Court
duly noted this weakness in the Eighth Circuit's analysis.14 Perhaps for
that reason the Supreme Court used a somewhat different rationale than
the Eighth Circuit to reach effectively the same result. However, even the
Supreme Court's rationale was not devoid of flaws.
The Court began its opinion by asserting that the wording of § 1221
explicitly precluded the motivational inquiry necessitated by the Corn
Products doctrine. The Court stated: "Section 1221 of the Internal
Revenue Code defines 'capital asset' broadly, as 'property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business),' and then
excludes five specific classes of property from capital-asset status."'47
The Court emphasized the parenthetical language in the statute, "(whether
or not connected with his trade or business)," and stated that because of
it, inquiries as to whether property was acquired for a business purpose
were irrelevant. 4 ' However, the Court's implication that characterizations
pursuant to the Corn Products doctrine must revolve around whether
property was acquired for a business purpose was inaccurate. The Corn
Products doctrine examined whether a transaction was integrally related
to everyday business operations on the one hand or was entered into for
investment purposes on the other, not merely, as the Court implied,
whether a transaction was simply connected to the taxpayer's busi-
ness.'49 Even if it was determined that a transaction was connected to a
146 See Brief for the Petitioner at 29-30, n.15, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,
485 U.S. 212 (1988) (No. 86-751).
4 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 215-16.
'4 Id. at 217.
' 4 See CHIESB, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 62, 17.02, at 284.
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taxpayer's trade or business, the Corn Products doctrine still required a
determination as to whether the transaction was integrally related to the
business' everyday operations or in the nature of an investment. Both
types of transactions could arise in connection with the taxpayer's trade
or business. Thus, contrary to the Court's assertion, the parenthetical
language did not preclude the type of inquiry called for by the Corn
Products doctrine.
Additionally, at the same time that the Court was misusing the
parenthetical language that it quoted from § 1221, it also misstated the
exceptions to § 1221. In describing the statutory exceptions from capital
asset treatment found in § 1221, it described § 1221(3) simply as denying
capital asset treatment to "'a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic
composition,' or similar property." ' In reality § 1221(3) denies capital
asset status only to copyrights and literary, musical or artistic composi-
tions or similar property "held by - (A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts
created such property"'' or a taxpayer whose basis in the property is
determined by reference to its creator's basis. 2 Thus, capital asset
status is granted to an artistic, literary, and musical work in the hands of
a taxpayer who did not create it or receive it from its creator as a gift.
This distinction, which the Court's description of § 1221(3) over-
looked, is extremely important for our purposes. It further demonstrates
that the statutory exceptions to capital asset treatment indicate that capital
asset treatment should not be given to assets that are integrally related to
the taxpayer's everyday business operations. Just as inventory is integrally
related to a typical business' everyday operations, so, too, are finished
works of art integrally related to an artist's everyday business operations.
Thus, both types of assets are denied capital asset status. But as art in the
hands of a collector is not integrally related to his everyday business
operations, it is generally granted capital asset status.' The Court, by
conveniently ignoring the statutory evidence of this important distinction,
was able to present the exceptions found in § 1221 as narrow exceptions,
unconnected by any underlying policy or theme.
"0 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 216.
I.R.C. § 1221(3)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
152 Id. § 1221(3)(C).
13This Article says "generally granted capital asset status" because pursuant to
§ 1221(3)(C) a collector who obtains a work of art as a gift from the artist will not obtain
capital asset treatment on the sale of that art work. The rationale for § 1221(3)(C) is,
however, readily explainable. It precludes an artist from obtaining the benefits of capital
gain treatment by giving his art work to a family member or close friend who might sell
the art, pay tax at capital gains rates, and turn the net after tax proceeds over to the artist.
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Once the statutory exceptions were presented in this manner, it was
a small step for the Court to read § 1221 literally. The Court did admit
some reluctance to ignore the fact that over twenty-five years of
Congressional silence indicated no displeasure with the Corn Products
doctrine." Still, the Court continued, "[w]e cannot ignore the unambig-
uous language of § 1221, however, no matter how reticent Congress has
been. If a broad exclusion from capital-asset status is to be created for
assets acquired for business purposes, it must come from congressional
action, not silence." '
The Court did not, however, overrule the Corn Products case itself.
Rather, the Court limited Corn Products to its specific facts and
"conclud[ed] that Corn Products is properly interpreted as standing for
the narrow proposition that hedging transactions that are an integral part
of a business' inventory-purchase system fall within the inventory
exclusion of § 1221."15' In reaching this conclusion the Court relied in
part upon the following statement in Corn Products that was emphasized
in the Government's brief:. 57 "'Nor can we find support for petitioner's
contention that hedging is not within the exclusions of [§ 1221].'"'
But as this Article has already noted, this statement did not necessarily
indicate that the Corn Products Court believed that the futures contracts
in question fell within the inventory exception.'59 Furthermore, despite
the Arkansas Best Court's contention to the contrary, 60 this Article has
already demonstrated that the Court's approach in Corn Products, when
compared to the Second Circuit's approach in that same case, indicates
that the Court did not want its holding to be so limited in application."
Thus, the Court's interpretation of Corn Products is not very convincing.
One short passage in the Court's opinion does, however, make the
Court's rejection of the Corn Products doctrine appear to be well-
founded. The Court, in justifying its literal reading of § 1221 stated:
"' Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 222 n.7.
155 Id.
16 Id. at 222.
" See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
,58 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 221 (quoting Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46, 51 (1955)).
See supra text accompanying notes 69 and 70.
"6 See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 221 ("This Court indicated its acceptance of the
Second Circuit's reasoning when it began the central paragraph of its opinion: 'Nor can
we find support for petitioner's contention that hedging is not within the exclusions of
[§ 1221].'").
" See supra text accompanying notes 62-70, 79-81, and 94-96.
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The legislative history of the capital-asset definition supports this
interpretation, see H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (1934)
C'[Mhe definition includes all property, except as specifically exclud-
ed") .... 162
Immediately thereafter, the Court quoted the Treasury regulation
interpreting that section: "'The term "capital assets" includes all classes
of property not specifically excluded by section 1221.""'
In the next section, this Article will take a closer look at the
legislative history behind the capital asset definition. Then it can be
determined if the Court's brief reference to it and to one sentence in the
regulations justified the rejection of the Corn Products doctrine for a
literal interpretation of § 1221.
IV. THE O iGiNs Op § 1221 AND WHAT THmY TELL Us
ABOUT THE ARKANSAS BEST AND CoRN PROD UCTS OPINIONs
The preceding Part of this Article demonstrated that the Arkansas
Best Court materially misstated the exceptions to capital asset status
found in § 1221 in a manner that made its literal interpretation of § 1221
appear entirely justifiable.'" Unfortunately, that Court also materially
misstated the origins of § 1221 in a manner that enabled it to ignore the
policy considerations that led to the creation of special treatment for
capital assets in the first place.
In its presentation of the history of § 1221, the Arkansas Best Court
stated, "The inventory exception was part of the original enactment of the
capital-asset provision in 1924. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §
208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 263." '65 However, the original enactment of the
capital asset provision occurred not in 1924, but rather in 1921.'"
Furthermore, the inventory exception also appeared in that original 1921
enactment.'" In 1924, the 1921 enactment was merely amended. But
that amendment and the legislative history behind it provide the key to
understanding the thinking of Congress as it formulated a definition for
the term "capital asset." By beginning its historical account with the
Revenue Act of 1924, rather than with the Revenue Act of 1921, the
', Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 218.
Id. (quoting Treas. keg. § 1.1221-1(a) (as amended in 1975)).
14 See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
165 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 218 n.6 (emphasis added).
'"Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921).
'"See id.
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Arkansas Best Court omitted key evidence of an investment versus
everyday business operations dichotomy in Congressional thinking that
is supportive of the Corn Products doctrine.'68
The original definition of the term "capital assets" appeared in
§ 206(a)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1921 and read as follows:
(6) The term "capital assets" as used in this section means property
acquired and held by the taxpayer for profit or investment for more than
two years (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but
does not include property held for the personal use or consumption of
the taxpayer or his family, or stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory
of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year. 9
Several aspects of this definition indicate that Congress intended to draw
a line between investment transactions on the one hand and transactions
integrally related to everyday business operations on the other. First,
reference was actually made to investment property in defining what
constituted a capital asset. However, this reference was superfluous and
confusing. 7' Second, the only initial exclusion from capital asset status
of property clearly held for profit or investment was property which, if
on hand at the end of the taxable year, would be properly included in
inventory. No property could be more exemplitive of everyday business
operations property. Third, and most important, however, is that property
qualified as a capital asset only if it was held by the taxpayer for more
than two years. Although a cogent argument has been made that capital
168 Unfortunately, this omission by the Court cannot be dismissed as merely an
oversight by a clerk who, in researching the history of the statutory provision, failed to
take his or her research back far enough. The government, in its brief, quoted the 1921
Act provision, thus noting the earlier enactment and its inclusion of the inventory
exception. See Brief for the Respondent at 20 n.10, Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,
485 U.S. at 212 (1988) (No. 86-751). In its brief the govemment, by citing only the
statutory language and the amendments to it from 1921 to 1924, was able to argue that,
at least beginning in 1924, investment motivation was irrelevant in determining capital
asset status. See id. However, this Article, by examining not just the statutory language,
but also the legislative history behind the language and the changes to it, will demonstrate
that the 1924 amendment was not actually intended to remove investment motivation from
consideration in determining capital asset status. One can only wonder why the Arkansas
Best Court, with its attention directed to the 1921 Act, delivered an opinion that not only
ignored the legislative history behind that Act and the amendment to it, but also ignored
the Act itself.
1" Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921).
'"' See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
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asset status should not simply revolve around the length of time that a
piece of property has been held,"' the fact remains that by holding
property over an extended period of time a taxpayer indicates that he is
holding the property for investment gains. Thus, by denying capital asset
status to property not held for more than two years, Congress precluded
capital asset status not simply from inventory items but also from all
other pieces of property whose purchase and sale had been in such close
proximity to each other that the holding of that property might appear to
be part of a business' everyday operations.
The legislative history behind the initial imposition of a special
regime for capital assets lends further support to the theory that Congress
was primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the effect of the tax
laws on long-term investments. The House Ways and Means Committee
Report which accompanied the Revenue Act of 1921 explained the
imposition of a preferential rate for capital gains in the following manner:
The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is now
seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series
of years are under the present law taxed as a lump sum (and the amount
of surtax greatly enhanced thereby) in the year in which the profit is
realized. Many such sales, with their possible profit taking and
consequent increase of the tax revenue, have been blocked by this
feature of the present law. In order to permit such transactions to go
forward without fear of a prohibitive tax, the proposed bill ... adds a
new section ... [which limits the rate of taxation] ... upon capital net
gain ... 172
The House's concern over the bunching into one year of those gains
that had accrued over a number of years was explained to the Senate
Finance Committee by Dr. T. S. Adams, who represented the Treasury
before Congress. 73 He gave as an example a situation in which gains
accrued over an eight year period!74 Dr. Adams explained that by
'71 See supra note 130.
172 HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1921, H.R.
REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921), reprinted in 95 INTERNAL REVENUE
Acms Op THE UNrrED STATES 1909-1950: LEIISLATVE HisToRm, LAWS, AND
ADMINISTRATIE DOCUMENTS (Bernard D. Reams ed., 1979) [hereinafter REVENUE AcTs
1909-1950].
' Richard S. Doyle, Taxation of Income Derived from Installment Sales, 4 NAT'L
INCOME TAX MAG. (TAXES) 53, 56 (1926).
1 Internal Revenue: Hearings on H.A 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance
[Confidential Printfor Use ofMembers of the Senate] 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 36-37 (1921)
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taxing in one year the gains that had accrued over eight years the tax
laws were imposing a higher nominal rate of tax than would have been
imposed if the gain had been taxed as it accrued.75 The purpose of the
capital gain provision, explained Dr. Adams, was to remove this high rate
of taxation caused by this bunching of gains so that "the sale of capital
assets ... [would cease].., being held up or blocked by the heavy rates
of taxation.'
176
Thereafter, the Senate Finance Committee issued a Report that, like
the House Report, explained the imposition of a preferential tax rate on
capital gains as an effort to alleviate the lock-in effect caused by the
bunching of long-term gains into one tax year.' Indeed, the only
explanation found in the entire legislative history of the 1921 Act for
singling out capital assets for special treatment is the alleviation of the
lock-in effect caused by this bunching of gains. As Congress' sole
concern in instituting a special regime for capital assets was to deal with
gains that had accrued over a number of years, Congress must not have
intended that regime to apply to the converse of such gains; namely,
gains that were integrally related to the everyday operations of a business.
In 1924, the definition of "capital assets" was amended to read as
follows:
The term "capital assets" means property held by the taxpayer for more
than two years (whether or not connected with his trade or business),
but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of
a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the
taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his trade or busi-
ness.17
8
Added to the exceptions from capital asset status was "property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his trade or business." 79
This new exception was added "to remove any doubt as to whether
(statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor, Treasury Department), reprinted in 95A
REVENuE AcTs 1909-1950, supra note 172.
'7- Id. at 37.
176 Id. at 36.
I7 See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, INTERNAL REVENuE BILL OF 1921, S. REP. No.
275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921), reprinted in 95A REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra
note 172.
1 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253, 263 (1924).17 Id.
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property which is held primarily for resale constitutes a capital asset
whether or not it is the type of property which under good accounting
practice would be included in inventory."'80 Thus, Congress more
clearly indicated that capital asset status was not intended for profits and
losses arising out of everyday business transactions.
Another definitional change brought in 1924, however, might at first
blush appear to remove completely all consideration of investment intent
in determining capital asset status. That change was the deletion of the
requirement found in the 1921 Act that a capital asset be held "for profit
or investment.'.' However, this deletion must be read in conjunction
with another 1924 deletion from the definitional language found in the
1921 Act. The 1921 Act provided that "[t]he term 'capital assets'.., does
not include property held for the personal use or consumption of the
taxpayer or his family....," This exclusion from capital asset status
of "property held for the personal use or consumption of the taxpayer or
his family .. ." was also deleted by the 1924 Act amendment.'83
In explaining these changes to the definition of "capital assets" the
Senate Finance Committee Report simply stated:
In the existing law, property held for the personal use or consumption
of the taxpayer or his family is excluded in the definition of capital
assets. In the proposed bill, this restriction has been removed, with the
purpose of permitting a taxpayer selling residential property at a profit
to elect to be taxed under the capital gain section if he so desires.'
One could argue that this portion of the Committee Report addresses only
the deletion of the exclusion of personal use or consumption property and
does not address the deletion of the requirement that a capital asset be
,,0 SENATE COMM. ON FNANCE, INTERNAL REvENuE BILL OF 1924, S. REP. No. 398,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1924), reprinted in 96 REvEN E AcTs 1909-1950, supra note
172.
'i Compare supra note 169 and accompanying text (defining "capital assets" under
the Revenue Act of 1921) with supra note 178 and accompanying text (defining "capital
assets" under the Revenue Act of 1924).
... See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
... Compare supra note 169 and accompanying text (defining "capital assets" under
the Revenue Act of 1921) with supra note 178 and accompanying text (defining "capital
assets" under the Revenue Act of 1924).
114 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, INTERNAL REvENUE BiLL oF 1924, S. REP.-No. 398,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1924), reprinted in 96 REVENUE ACTs 1909-1950, supra note
172.
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
held "for profit or investment." However, explanatory notes prepared for
the Senate Finance Committee to accompany the statutory language state:
On page 39, lines 9 and 10, the words "for profit or investment" and in
lines 12 and 13 the words "property held for the personal use or
consumption of the taxpayer or his family," which words appear in the
existing law, were not proposed to be stricken out by the Treasury draft.
The effect of striking out the words is to treat as capital assets dwelling
houses and other property held for personal use."
Thus, the drafters of the 1924 Act apparently deleted the words "for
profit or investment" simply to clarify that personal use property could
now qualify for capital asset status.
Any confusion generated by the deletion of the words "for profit or
investment" should, nevertheless, be blamed on their unfortunate
inclusion in the definition of capital asset in the first place. Congress, in
1921, could have just as effectively excluded personal use or consumption
property from the definition of capital asset by stating (as it did) that such
property was excluded, without adding the requirement that a capital asset
be held "for profit or investment." The inclusion of the "for profit or
investment" requirement in 1921 most likely resulted from a misguided
excess of caution on the part of the statutory drafters.
This excess of caution may well have resulted from the fact that the
income tax laws have always drawn a line between expenditures incurred
for profit or investment on the one hand and expenditures incurred for
personal consumption reasons on the other. In fact, I.R.C. § 162 which
allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness," '' s and IR.C. § 262, which generally denies a deduction "for
personal, living, or family expenses,"'" both find their origins in the
Income Tax Law of 1913,8' the first income tax statute promulgated
"I STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 68TH CONG., IsT Sass., COMARATVE
PRINT OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1924 Supp. I, n.2 (Comm. Print No. 2 1924), reprinted
in 67 REVENUE Acts 1909-1950, supra note 172.
" I.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1995).
187 Id. § 262(a).
..8 In fact, current §§ 162 and 262 were originally found together in a single section
which provided in pertinent part, "in computing net income for the purpose of the normal
tax there shall be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in
carrying on any business, not including personal, living, or family expenses .... Income
Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § H., B., 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913).
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pursuant to the Sixteenth Amendment.' 9 Developments in the tax
statutes to this day continue to draw the same line. Thus, § 212 extends
the deductibility granted by § 162 to expenditures "incurred... for the
production ... of income"' even if those expenditures do not arise
out of a taxpayer's trade or business. 9' The tax laws now even attempt
to draw the line when a taxpayer may have incurred an expense for both
personal and business reasons. Thus, § 183 not only limits the deductibili-
ty of expenses incurred in activities not engaged in for profit (such as
hobbies), but also raises a presumption as to when an activity is engaged
in for profit so that all the expenditures incurred in it may be deduct-
ed. 92 Furthermore, § 280A draws brightline distinctions with technical
rules to determine when the costs of maintaining an office in one's home
are deductible.'93 Nevertheless, this longstanding distinction in the tax
laws between expenditures for profit or investment on the one hand and
expenditures incurred for personal consumption reasons on the other,
should have been immaterial to the drafters of the 1921 Act.
The longstanding distinction is necessary so that the tax is imposed
only upon actual accretions to one's wealth."4 If deductions were not
19 The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provides, "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
I.R.C. § 212(1) (West Supp. 1995).
Current I.R.C. § 212(1) originated as § 23(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. That subsection was added to the Code by § 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942.
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 121, 56 Stat. 798, 819 (1942). In reporting this new
provision out, the Senate Finance Committee stated, "The amendment made by this
section allows a deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses of an individual paid
or incurred during the taxable year for the production ... of income,... whether or not
such expenses are paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business ...." SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, THE REVENUE BILL OP 1942, S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 87 (1942), reprinted in 108 REVENUE AcmS 1909-1950, supra note 172.
'n I.R.C. § 183 (West Supp. 1995).
Id. § 280A.
The notion that a theoretically pure income tax is a tax on one's accretions to
wealth comes from what is commonly known as the Haig-Simons definition of income.
Henry Simons formulated a classic definition of income as follows: "the algebraic sum
of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in value
of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in
question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). In so doing, he
drew from the work of tRM. Haig and quoted Haig as defining income as "'the money
value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points in time."' Id. at
61 (quoting Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7
(Robert M. Haig ed., 1921)). As Simons so succinctly noted, there are, therefore, two
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allowed for expenses incurred in the generation of income, the tax would
be imposed on more than one's accretion to wealth and would thus be a
tax on gross receipts rather than a tax on income. 9' If deductions were
allowed for personal consumption expenditures, the tax would be imposed
on less than one's income because the "market value of rights exercised
in consumption" would be improperly removed from the tax base." A
line must therefore be drawn between for profit or investment expendi-
tures on the one hand and personal consumption expenditures on the
other in determining what is deductible so that the tax is imposed on no
more and no less than one's true income.
The drafters of the 1921 Revenue Act, however, in defining the term
"capital asset" were not trying to determine what is properly deductible
in an effort to impose the tax on the theoretically correct tax base. In fact,
they were doing just the opposite. They were deviating from the income
tax ideal by imposing a different rate upon a different type of income as
determined by its source.'97 By including the "for profit or investment"
requirement in the initial capital asset definition, the drafters added a
superfluous and irrelevant phrase whose necessary deletion only three
years later could be cause for confusion.
It is not mutually inconsistent to hold the same property for personal
use and for profit or investment. Many persons view their residences, the
property referred to in the 1924 Act's Committee Report9 ' and
explanatory note,'99 as investments. So too, fine art may be held both
for personal use and for profit or investment. As we have seen, drawing
basic components to the concept of income. One is the market value of amounts
consumed. This takes into account that portion of one's income that is currently used and
transformed into goods and services. The other is the portion of income that is not
currently consumed but is saved for future use. Both portions, however, represent
accretions to wealth. To the extent that consumption comes from previous savings rather
than from current income, the Simons formula takes this into account by offsetting that
"dissavings" against consumption in the second part of the formula. Thus for a tax to be
on one's income under the Haig-Simons approach, it must be on no more and no less than
one's accretion to wealth, and to determine accretions to wealth one must take into
account amounts consumed during the period in question.
'5 See supra note 194.
' See supra note 194.
Under the Haig-Simons definition no mention is made as to how income from
differing sources should be treated. This failure to distinguish types of income by their
sources, however, is entirely proper because under a purely theoretical wealth accretion
approach to income, the source of that income is irrelevant. To rephrase Gertrude Stein,
an accretion is an accretion is an accretion[
t' See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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a line between personal use or consumption expenditures on the one hand
and profit or investment motivated expenditures on the other is essential
in the deduction area to arrive at a proper tax base."° However, once
we decide to deviate from the proper tax base by taxing a certain type of
income, as determined by its source, at a preferential rate, the need to
draw the line between personal use or consumption expenditures on the
one hand and for profit or investment expenditures on the other disap-
pears into thin air. Congress, therefore, did not need to include the "for
profit or investment" requirement in its 1921 Act capital asset definition
because that definition already excluded personal use or consumption
property. Its removal in 1924 should be deemed the removal of unneces-
sary surplusage. On the other hand, by retaining in the 1924 Act the
requirement that property be held for more than two years to qualify for
capital asset status, Congress was still indicating that only property held
long enough to generate investment gains should be accorded capital asset
treatment. AS a result, the deletion of the words "for profit or investment"
in 1924 should not be interpreted as making irrelevant to capital asset
determinations the taxpayer's investment motivation (or lack thereof) in
acquiring and holding an item of property.
Before terminating its discussion of the Revenue Act of 1924 this
Article must note one additional provision that came into the tax law at
that time. With the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress, for the first time,
placed a limit on the deductibility of capital losses."' Until this limita-
tion was placed in the tax law, a taxpayer could limit the taxability of net
capital gains under the Revenue Act of 1921,'02 but nothing in the law
' See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
2" New § 208(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924 limited the deductibility of capital
losses as follows:
In the case of any taxpayer (other than a corporation) who for any taxable
year sustains a capital net loss, there shall be levied, collected, and paid, in lieu
of the taxes imposed by sections 210 and 211 of this title, a tax determined as
follows:
A partial tax shall be computed upon the basis of the ordinary net income
at the rates and in the manner provided in sections 210 and 211, and the total
tax shall be this amount minus 12Y2 per centune of the capital net loss; but in
no case shall the tax under this subdivision be less than the taxes imposed by
sections 210 and 211 computed without regard to the provisions of this section.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 253, 263 (1924).
' Section 206(b) of the Revenue Act of 1921 granted preferential tax treatment to
capital gains as follows:
In the case of any taxpayer (other than a corporation) who for any taxable
year derives a capital net gain, there shall (at the election of the taxpayer) be
levied, collected and paid, in lieu of the taxes imposed by sections 210 and 211
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limited his ability to utilize net capital losses to their full extent to offset
ordinary income. Congress believed the opportunity for tax avoidance was
too great 3 and the injustice to the government so clear" under the
of this title, a tax determined as follows:
A partial tax shall first be computed upon the basis of the ordinary net
income at the rates and in the manner provided in sections 210 and 211, and the
total tax shall be this amount plus 12N per centum of the capital net gain; but
if the taxpayer elects to be taxed under this section the total tax shall in no such
case be less than 12Y2 per centurn of the total net income. The total tax thus
determined shall be computed, collected and paid in the same manner, at the
same time and subject to the same provision of law, including penalties, as
other taxes under this title.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921). Preferential treatment
of capital gains continued in the Revenue Act of 1924 as follows:
'In the case of any taxpayer (other than corporation) who for any taxable
year derives a capital net gain, there shall (at the election of the taxpayer) be
levied, collected and paid, in lieu of the taxes imposed by sections 210 and 211
of this title, a tax determined as follows:
A partial tax shall first be computed upon the basis of the ordinary net
income at the rates and in the manner provided in sections 210 and 211, and the
total tax shall be this amount plus 12Y2 per centum of the capital net gain.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(b), 43 Stat. 253, 263 (1924).
2 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1924,
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1924), reprinted in 96 REVENUE AcrS
1909-1950, supra note 172.
' The problem faced by the government was clearly explained in a committee report
to a proposed bill that would have amended the Revenue Act of 1921. Although that
particular bill never became law, the substance of it became the limitation on the
deductibility of capital losses contained in the Revenue Act of 1924. The committee
report accompanying this proposed bill stated
Congress, in the revenue act of 1921 ... provide[d] that the tax on capital gains
in the case of property acquired and held by the taxpayer for profit or
investment for more than two years should be limited to 12N per cent. But
Congress failed to place a similar limitation on capital losses, so that today the
taxpayer pays a maximum tax of 12Y2 per cent on gains derived from the sale
of capital assets, but is allowed to deduct in full from his taxable income his net
losses resulting from the sale of capital assets during the taxable year. The
injustice to the Government is too obvious to require much comment. The
taxpayer may refrain from taking his profits, or, if he does take them, pays but
a 12Y2 per cent tax, whereas he is at liberty any time to take advantage of any
losses that may have been incurred and avail himself of a full deduction from
his income. When we consider that the rate on the larger incomes runs as high
as 58 per cent, it can readily be realized how great the advantage is. The
Government can collect but 12Y2 per cent of a gain, but it is compelled to
lighten the burden of the taxpayer to the extent of 58 percent of his losses.
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circumstances that logic required a limitation on the deductibility of net
capital losses °0
The technical details of the form this loss limitation took from time
to time are not as important for purposes of the present discussion as is
the fact that a limitation on the deductibility of capital losses entered the
law. As we shall see, the presence of this limitation precipitated
additional Congressional tinkering with the definition of the term "capital
asset." The tinkering that resulted from the existence of a limitation on
the deductibility of capital losses should not, however, be interpreted as
evidencing a policy shift away from the purpose of the original capital
asset definition. That purpose, of avoiding the lock-in effect on assets
held for investment gains,2°6 remained throughout the subsequent
changes that were made in the definition of capital asset. The balance of
this Part of this Article will analyze a few of the major definitional
changes that subsequently transpired to demonstrate the continued
viability of the initial policy behind the capital asset definition.
From 1924 until 1934 the definition of capital asset remained
basically unchanged. Then, in the Revenue Act of 1934,07 Congress
substantively restructured the definition of the term "capital asset."
Because the Arkansas Best Court cited the legislative history surrounding
the changes contained in this Act to support its literal reading of current
§ 1221,20' the 1934 Act changes must be scrutinized to determine if the
Arkansas Best Court was correct in using the legislative history as it did.
In 1934 Congress recognized that the requirement of a two-year
holding period in the definition of "capital asset" was leading to
unwanted manipulations by taxpayers. On the one hand, taxpayers
holding assets that had dropped in value would sell them just before the
two-year time period expired. Such a sale would preclude the assets from
being deemed capital assets, thus not subjecting the loss on the sale to the
limitation on the deductibility of capital losses. On the other hand,
taxpayers holding appreciated assets would forestall sales of those assets
until the two-year holding period had elapsed. After the holding period
had elapsed, those assets were deemed capital assets and the full tax
H.R. Rep. No. 1388, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 2 (1923).
'0s See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, INTERNAL REvENuE BILL OF 1924,
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1924), reprinted in 96 REVENUE AcTs
1909-1950, supra, note 172.
See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
Ch. 277, § 117(b), 48 Stat. 680, 714 (1934). See infra notes 210-12 and
accompanying text.
m See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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preference was available regardless of how much or how little longer the
assets were held."9
The solution was to remove the holding period completely from the
definition of capital asset210 and instead to place it in a separate provi-
sion dealing with the taxability of capital gains and losses.21 By
removing the holding period from the definition of capital asset, Congress
was able to stop the revenue drain caused by the dumping of loss assets
just before the two-year holding period expired. Net losses from sales or
exchanges of similar types of assets were subject to limitations on their
2o See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1934,
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1934), reprinted in 100 REVENUE AcrS
1909-1950, supra note 172; see also Anita Wells, Legislative History of the Treatment of
Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12, 19-20
(1949).
210 Section 117(b) of the Revenue Act of 1934 thus defined "capital assets" as
follows:
(b) DEPfINMON OF CAPrrAL ASETS. - For the purposes of this title,
"capital assets" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected
with his trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer
or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory
of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business.
Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(b), 48 Stat. 680, 714 (1934).
The only other substantive change contained in this definition was the insertion of
the requirement that property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business
be held primarily for sale "to customers" in order to be excluded from capital asset
treatment. This insertion was placed in the definition to preclude stock speculators,
who were trading on their accounts, from denying their stock was a capital asset in
order to avoid the capital loss limitation provisions. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1385,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934), reprinted in 100 REVENUE ACTs 1909-1950, supra note
172.
21 See § 117(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, which provided:
GENERAL RULE. - In the case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation, only
the following percentages of the gain or loss recognized upon the sale or
exchange of a capital asset shall be taken into account in computing net
income:
100 per centum if the capital asset has been held for not more than 1 year;,
80 per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 1 year but
not for more than 2 years;
60 per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 2 years but
not for more than 5 years;
40 per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 5 years but
not for more than 10 years;
30 per centum if the capital asset has been held for more than 10 years.
Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680, 714 (1934).
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deductibility regardless of how short a period of time any of those assets
had been held."'
It is in the context of this loophole-closing change that the legislative
history cited by the Arkansas Best Court should be read. The Court, to
support its literal reading of current § 1221 and its rejection of the Corn
Products doctrine, stated:
The legislative history of the capital-asset definition supports this
interpretation, see H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1934)
("[Tlhe definition includes all property, except as specifically exclud-
ed") ... as does the applicable Treasury regulation, see 26 CER §
1.1221-1(a) (1987) ("The term 'capital assets' includes all classes of
property not specifically excluded by section 1221").213
The above-quoted statement from the 1934 Committee Report,
however, appears in a portion of that Report that is noting the technical
details that result from the new structural treatment of capital gains and
losses in the Revenue Act of 1934.14 As the major structural change
involved the removal of the holding period from the actual definition of
"capital asset,'" 5 the quoted language could easily be interpreted as
simply highlighting the fact that the definition now turned only on the
type of property involved and not on the length of time that it was held.
If this is all that was intended by the Committee Report, then this cryptic
line should not be interpreted as demanding a rigid and literal reading of
the statutory definition without regard to the underling policy concerns.
Ironically, the Treasury Regulation also quoted by the Arkansas Best
Court supports just this limited interpretation. The full text of the
Treasury Regulation quoted by the Arkansas Best Court did not simply
state, "The term 'capital assets' includes all classes of property not
specifically excluded by section 1221," as it appears in the Court's
21Z See § 117(d) of the Revenue Act of 1934, which provided in pertinent part,
"Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of
$2,000 plus the gains from such sales or exchanges." Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ "117(d), 48 Stat. 680, 715 (1934).
2 Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 218 (1988).
214 See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1934, H.
REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 30-32 (1934), reprinted in 100 REvENUE ACTS
1909-1950, supra note 172. The technical details in this part of the Report, however, must
be read in conjunction with the Report's earlier explanation of the reasons for the change
in the definition of "capital assets." See id. at 9-10.
2s See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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opinion. "6 Rather, the ful text provided: "The term 'capital assets'
includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by section 1221.
In determining whether property is a 'capital asset'. the period for which
held is immaterial."217 Moreover, this regulatory provision had its
origins in Article 117-1 of Regulations 86 Relating to the Income Tax
Under the Revenue Act of 1934. That original regulation, in its entirety,
provided:
ART. 117-1. Meaning capital of assets. - The term "capital
assets" includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by
section 117(b). The term is not limited to stocks and bonds nor to
property held for more than two years. In determining whether property
is a "capital asset," the period for which held is immaterial.218
This contemporaneous interpretation of the 1934 Act's new definition
of "capital assets," which in part tracks the quoted language from the
quoted Committee Report, is strong evidence that that quoted language
was merely intended to highlight the removal of the holding period from
the definition of capital asset. If, as it appears, that is all that was
intended, the legislative history offered by the Arkansas Best Court is not
very persuasive in arguing for a literal interpretation of current § 1221 in
disregard of the underlying policy considerations that the Corn Products
Court found controlling.
In evaluating whether the Corn Products Court reached the proper
conclusions as to the policy underlying the capital asset definition, the
origins of current §§ 1221(2) and 1231 are quite enlightening. Section
1221(2) excludes from the definition of "capital asset" depreciable
property used in a taxpayer's trade or business and real property used in
his trade or business.219 Section 1231, however, provides special
treatment for such property. Generally speaking, § 1231 provides capital
treatment for such property if all sales, exchanges and involuntary
conversions (including condemnation by eminent domain) in a taxable
year net out to a gain, but provides ordinary treatment if they net out to
a loss ° The result is preferential capital treatment if there are net
u" See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(a) (as amended in 1975) (emphasis added).
" Treas. Reg. 117-1 (1935) (emphasis added), reprinted in 140 REVENUE ACTs 1909-
1950, supra note 172.
I.R.C. § 1221(2) (West Supp. 1995).
220 Id. § 1231.
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gains but no limitation on the deductibility against ordinary income if
there are net losses.
Section 1221(2) first appeared in the tax laws in § 117(a)(1) of the
Revenue Act of 1938 which excluded from the definition of "capital
assets" "property, used in the trade or business, of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation."' The Revenue Act of 1942
added to this exclusion "real property used in the trade or business of the
taxpayer"' so that depreciable buildings and the land on which they
sat would receive similar tax treatment.'n When the 1938 provision was
being considered, the House Ways and Means Committee stated that this
new provision was based upon a recognition that all business gains and
losses directly affect profits and thus should be taxed similarly?'
Taken by itsel, this statement would undercut the validity of the Corn
Products doctrine which was based upon the premise that Congress
intended to draw a line between those transactions that were integrally
related to everyday business operations and those that were not. However,
read in context, it does not.
The Corn Products doctrine arose out of a case in which the Court
was considering the policy underlying the granting of preferential
treatment to certain types of gains. Yet the example which follows the
above-noted statement in the Committee Report indicates that in 1938
Congress was thinking primarily about how this change in the capital
asset definition would affect the deductibility of losses2' That Con-
gress was primarily concerned with the effect of the capital loss deduction
limitations is further demonstrated by an earlier statement in that same
Committee Report that the change in "[tihe definition of capital assets
... in the great majority of cases, should be of benefit to the taxpayer,
since it will allow him to take losses against his ordinary income from the
sale of such property."' 6 Indeed, only four years later, when the
predecessor to current § 1231 was being enacted, the Ways and Means
Committee indicated that the predecessor to § 1221(2) had been enacted
22 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 117(a)(1), 52 Stat. 447, 500 (1938).
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 151(a), 56 Stat. 798, 846 (1942), amending
§ 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
223 See SENATE COMm. ON FINANCE, REVENUE BILL OF 1942, S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1942), reprinted in 108 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950, supra note 172.
m HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTENAL REVENUE BILL oF 1938, H.R.
REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 34 (1938), reprinted in 103 REVENUE AcTs 1909-
1950, supra note 172.
22 Id. at 34-35.
2 Id. at 7.
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in 1938 solely to deal with the harshness of the limitation on the
deductibility of capital losses. 7
It stands to reason that in 1938 Congress was more concerned with
the tax consequences of losses than it was with the tax consequences of
gains. Late in 1937 a major recession began that pushed the economy
even further into the depths of the Great Depression." Concerns about
the tax treatment of gains were irrelevant at that time. Thus, the
enactment of the predecessor to § 1221(2) should be viewed simply as an
attempt to alleviate the hardship caused by the limitation of the deduct-
ibility of capital losses and not as a pullback from the policy of granting
preferential treatment on the gains side of the ledger to only those assets
held for investment gains. The 1942 enactment of the predecessor to
§ 1231 merely confirms this theory.
The predecessor to § 1231 has been described as "addressed to a
problem of limited scope," namely the hardship incurred by persons
whose property was seized by the government through condemnation or
sold to the government under threat of condemnation for use in World
War II. As wartime shortages often caused the value of property to rise
above its adjusted basis, the forced realization of this property at
temporarily inflated wartime prices would generate a large tax liability
absent an ameliorative provision." The relief granted was providing
capital asset treatment to most depreciable and real property used in the
taxpayer's trade or business if the gains and losses from sales or
exchanges in such property netted out to a gain.31 Section 1231 has
therefore been described as "a statute ... that persisted long after the
rationale had disappeared." 2
The foregoing analysis of the genesis of § 1231 finds support in the
House Ways and Means Committee Report which noted the tax problem
confronting a taxpayer who sold trawlers used in his business to the
Government at a gain.13 However, the description of § 1231 as a
227 House COMM. ON WAYS AND MFANS, INTRaNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1942, H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1942), reprinted in 108 REVENUE ACTS
1909-1950, supra note 172.
s ee JoHN F. WrTrE, THE PoLncs AND DEVELOPMENT OF TiE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 104 (1985).
219 BoRis I. BnTKE & LAWRENCE M. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFr
TAXATION 578 (4th ed. 1972).
230 Id. at 578-79.
"' Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846 (1942), adding § 117(j)
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
2 BrrrKER & STONE, supra note 229, at 579.
23 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1942, H.R.
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provision "that has persisted long after the rationale had disap-
peared!" implies that there is something anomalous about granting
preferential capital gain treatment to real and depreciable property used
in one's trade or business. That implication is even more specifically
presented in a successor edition to the book that described § 1231 as
persisting after its rationale had disappeared. That successor edition
describes § 1231 as a provision:
which seems more a response to economic or political forces than to tax
logic. The rule embodied in § 1221(2) seems logically correct since it
is hard to see any good reason for distinguishing, for tax purposes,
between gains or losses arising from normal business operations and
gains or losses from disposing of assets used in the businessP 5
Unless the foregoing statement is meant as a condemnation for having a
capital asset distinction in the first place (which, read in context, it does
not appear to be), this statement is open to criticism on more than one
count.
First, it ignores the longstanding policy evident in the definition of
a capital asset of distinguishing between gains arising from everyday
business operations and gains from assets held for investment. Second,
and relatedly, by not giving the history surrounding the enactment of
§ 1221(2), that statement makes § 1221(2) appear as a norm that
undercuts any claim that Congress intended in its definition of capital
assets to draw any line between gains from everyday business operations
and gains from assets held for investment. Yet, as we have seen,
§ 1221(2) came into the tax laws only to eliminate hardship in the case
of loss and, in reality, not to treat all gains in any way connected to one's
trade or business in an identical manner. 6 Indeed, because the prede-
cessor to § 1221(2) came into the tax laws only four years before the
predecessor to § 1231, § 1231 can be viewed as merely undoing the
change wrought upon the capital asset definition by § 1221(2)'s predeces-
sor in gain situations while retaining in loss situations the amelioration
from hardship that that section provided.
When one purchases real or depreciable property for use in one's
trade or business that person can be deemed to be investing for the long
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1942), reprinted in 108 REVENUE ACTS
1909-1950, supra note 172.
' See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
2 nSWIIlAM A. KLEIN Er AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 847 (8th ed. 1990).
"' See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
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term in that trade or business. The lock-in effect that gave rise to the
original capital gain preference in 1921 could thwart the otherwise
economically sensible sale of these business assets just as it could thwart
the sale of any other assets. As a result, § 1231 should be viewed not as
a World War H anomaly but rather as an equitable effort to bring the
capital asset definition back in consonance with its original 1921 policy
roots while simultaneously accounting for the ramifications of the later-
enacted capital loss deduction limitations.
I Although he does not engage in a similar analysis of the development of the
definition of "capital asset," and more particularly §§ 1221(2) and 1231, Professor
Chireistein also sees a somewhat similar justification for the asymmetrical treatment
provided by § 1231. He states:
[Aln argument can be made that the present nonsymmetrical treatment is
actually correct as a matter of tax policy (depending, of course, on a willingness
to accept capital-ordinary distinctions to begin with). Thus, on the gain side, it
can be argued that sales of fixed assets, as opposed to stock-in-trade, are really
extraordinary transactions which involve the disposition of a part of the business
itself. They do not occur in the regular course of operations, and the profits
which they generate often represent appreciation that has accrued over an
extended period of time. "Mobility of capital" considerations are also relevant:
as with conventional investment property, if we impose a tax at full rates
merely because there has been a realization, the owners of such assets may be
deterred from transferring their funds to better and more desirable economic
uses, including the purchase of new equipment.
As respects losses, although symmetry would be expected normally, in the
present context we find ourselves dealing with depreciable property, rather than
corporate stock or the like. If the property were retained by the taxpayer for the
remainder of its useful life, an ordinary loss would be allowed, in effect,
through annual deductions for depreciation. The same would be true if the
property were simply abandoned or scrapped without being sold at all. Since
investment in depreciable property, thus, is recoverable through an offset against
ordinary income, the result, arguably, should be no different when allowable
depreciation is anticipated by the sale of the property at a loss. To be sure, this
justification does not serve very well where land is concerned, because land is
non-depreciable. However, the alleged difficulty of allocating the purchase price
of real estate between land and buildings when both are sold together has
evidently convinced Congress that it would be too burdensome to insist on
separate capital loss treatment for the land component.
CHIRESTEIN, FEDERAL INCONM TAXATION, supra note 62, 18.02(a), at 320. Professor
Chirelstein's analysis of the loss side in a manner that justifies ordinary loss treatment for
depreciable property but not for corporate stock, an asset often given ordinary loss
treatment under the Corn Products doctrine, see supra notes 101-04 and accompanying
text, most likely results from the fact that he was examining the language of § 1231
without examining the legislative history of §§ 1221(2) and 1231 and from the fact that
he was not tying the history behind those sections in to the Corn Products doctrine, which
we are doing here. See infra text accompanying notes 238-41.
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This analysis of the history of §§ 1221(2) and 1231 gives rise to an
interesting conclusion with respect to the Corn Products doctrine. From
a Congressional policy standpoint, Corn Products was absolutely correct
on the gain side - preferential treatment should be granted only to gains
on transactions in assets not integrally related to everyday profits and
losses. That conclusion is not very surprising. However, the ramifications
of Corn Products in loss transactions are also consistent with Con-
gressional policy. This conclusion may, however, at first appear to be
surprising.
The taxpayer's ability to use Corn Products to his advantage in loss
situations gave rise to taxpayer abuse and difficulties in administration by
the Internal Revenue Service, as was noted by the Arkansas Best
Court"a and Professor Chirelstein.rs Nonetheless, read together, the
legislative histories of the 1938 and 1942 Revenue Acts strongly indicate
that Congress did not want the "integrally related to everyday business
operations" distinction to operate on the loss side. It wanted all business
losses to be fully deductible.24 Thus, in applying the Corn Products
211 The Arkansas Best Court stated:
It is also important to note that the business-motive test advocated by
petitioner is subject to the same kind of abuse that the Court condemned in
Corn Products. The Court explained in Corn Products that unless hedging
transactions were subject to ordinary gain and loss treatment, taxpayers engaged
in such transactions could "transmute ordinary income into capital gain at will."
The hedger could gamer capital-asset treatment by selling the future and
purchasing the commodity on the spot market, or ordinary-asset treatment by
taking delivery under the future contract. In a similar vein, if capital stock
purchased and held for a business purpose is an ordinary asset, whereas the
same stock purchased and held with an investment motive is a capital asset, a
taxpayer such as Arkansas Best could have significant influence over whether
the asset would receive capital or ordinary treatment. Because stock is most
naturally viewed as a capital asset, the Internal Revenue Service would be hard
pressed to challenge a taxpayer's claim that stock was acquired as an invest-
ment, and that a gain arising from the sale of such stock was therefore a capital
gain. Indeed, we are unaware of a single decision that has applied the business-
motive test so as to require a taxpayer to report a gain from the sale of stock
as an ordinary gain. If the same stock is sold at a loss, however, the taxpayer
may be able to gamer ordinary-loss treatment by emphasizing the business
purpose behind the stock's acquisition. The potential for such abuse was
evidenced in this case by the fact that as late as 1974, when Arkansas Best still
hoped to sell the Bank stock at a profit, Arkansas Best apparently expected to
report the gain as a capital gain.
485 U.S. at 222-23 (citations omitted).
See supra note 81.
o See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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doctrine to losses, taxpayers were trying to effectuate what Congress
wanted all along - the full deductibility of all business losses.
By taldng into account the effect of the limitations on the deductibili-
ty of capital losses along with the history behind the enactments to the
predecessors of §§ 1221(2) and 1231, we see that the Corn Products
doctrine fits quite nicely into the policy evident behind the definition of
"capital assets." The opportunity for taxpayers to abuse the doctrine could
have been easily eliminated by a simple statutory provision, had Congress
so desired.2"
One final change brought about by the Revenue Act of 1942 deserves
mention. This Article has previously noted that the length of the holding
period required for obtaining preferential capital treatment for gains
strongly indicated the importance of investment intent 22 The 1942 Act
reduced thatholding period to only six months.4 One could argue that
with such a short holding period in place investment intent was no longer
of much importance. However, in proposing the new and shorter six-
month holding period, the Senate Finance Committee stated:
Your committee has reduced the holding period to 6 months. ... The
realization of a capital gain is entirely a matter within the discretion of
the taxpayer. If the rates are too high, the Government will lose not
"' In fact, in 1976 Congress had before it H.R. 10902, reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
94-1360, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976). That bill would have eliminated the opportunity
for taxpayer abuse of the Corn Products doctrine with respect to the purchase and sale
of corporate securities. It would have required taxpayers to file a notice with the Internal
Revenue Service within thirty-one days of purchasing a security stating that the security
was purchased for business and not investment purposes or be forever barred from
arguing for ordinary loss treatment. The accompanying committee report described the
workings of the provision as follows:
The giving of notice does not guarantee ordinary loss treatment for a
taxpayer he still must establish that he did not acquire and hold the stock as
a capital asset. The bill simply adds a threshold condition for ordinary loss
treatment that, in any event, the taxpayer must have filed the required notice
within the required period.
If a taxpayer filed the necessary notice and realizes a gain when he sells the
security, the bill provides that his gain is to be ordinary income and not capital
gain. In such a situation, ordinary income treatment is automatic; the bill does
not permit the taxpayer to show that on the particular facts he held the stock as
a capital asset.
H.R REP. No. 94-1360, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976). However, the bill failed to pass
Congress. See 122 CONG. Rac. INDEx 1279 (1976).
24 See supra text accompanying note 171.
u See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 150(a)(1), 56 Stat. 798, 843 (1942),
amending § 117(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
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only income taxes but also stamp taxes upon the transfer of property.
The net receipts from capital gains and losses have been steadily
declining ....
Your committee believes that the lowering of the holding period
will have the effect of encouraging the realization of capital gains and
thereby result in added revenue to the Treasury. It is believed that a
holding period of 6 months will be a sufficient deterrent to the
speculator as contrasted with the legitimate investor.'
It should be clear, therefore, that investment intent was still deemed
highly relevant.
This Part of the Article has traced the development of and policy
behind §§ 1221(1), 1221(2), and 1231, the key provisions for purposes
of the Corn Products doctrine. Earlier this Article noted how § 1221(3)
is consistent with the Corn Products doctrine's drawing of a line between
those transactions integrally related to everyday business operations and
those that are not, and it criticized the Arkansas Best opinion for
describing § 1221(3) in a manner that obfuscated that point. 5 Current
§ 1221(4) excludes from capital asset status "accounts or notes receivable
acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business for services rendered
or from the sale of property described in [§ 1221(1)]." '  Clearly, this
exclusion relates to assets integrally related to everyday business
operations. The last subsection of § 1221 in effect at the time of the
Arkansas Best decision and with which the Court concerned itself was
current § 1221(5)."4 That section, excluding from capital asset status
certain government publications received from the government for less
than their public sale price, came into the Code because of the strange
effect that capital asset status has on the charitable contribution deduc-
tion." There is not much of a secondary market for these documents
so the enactment of this exclusion has nothing to do with the taxation of
gains or losses from the sale of these assets. As a result, § 1221(5) is
m SENATE COM. ON FINANCE, REVENUE BiLL op 1942, S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1942), reprinted in 108 REvENuE ACrs 1909-1950, supra note
172 (emphasis added).
s See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
24 I.R.C. § 1221(4) (West Supp. 1995).
2 Id. § 1221(5); see also Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 216
n.2 (1988).
24 See 2 Botus I. BrnKEn & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOMIE,
ESTATES AND GuFrs 51.6, at 51-38 to 51-39 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the rationale for
denying capital asset status to certain federal publications); see also S. CONF. REP. No.
94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 807, 936 (1976).
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irrelevant to any analysis of the validity of the Corn Products doctrine. Where
all of this history leads us will be the subject of some concluding thoughts.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The foregoing historical analysis can lead to only one conclusion. The
rationale of the Court in Corn Products, and to a large extent the doctrine
that it spawned, are consonant with the policy inherent in the develop-
ment of the definition of the term "capital asset." On the other hand, the
opinion of the Court in Arkansas Best can be viewed as a distressing
example of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
From a policy analysis perspective not only does the Arkansas Best
Court appear not to appreciate the policy behind the statute it is
interpreting, but moreover, the Court presents that statute in an edited
manner that improperly makes that statute appear not to be guided by any
coherent policy theme at all. 49 Furthermore, the Court's use of legisla-
tive history to support its rejection of the Corn Products doctrine can
most charitably be described as "sloppy." First, the Court misstates the
revenue act that was the genesis of the definition of "capital asset" even
though the government's brief correctly stated the act which first defined
"capital assets" ' and as a result of this misstatement overlooks key
evidence of the policy behind Congress' determination of what that term
encompassed." Then the Court quotes legislative history which, when
read in context, can reasonably be interpreted to stand for something far
different from the proposition for which the Arkansas Best Court was
using it. 2
The above criticism of the Supreme Court's opinion in Arkansas Best
should not be interpreted as a ringing endorsement of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Corn Products. In that opinion the Court eschewed a
literal reading of the statutory definition of "capital assets" in favor of a
policy-oriented approach, when the same result in the case before it could
have been reached by paying far more homage to the exact wording of
governing statutory language. 3 While the Court may have had valid
reasons for taking a non-literal approach to the definition of "capital
assets," by unnecessarily doing so in deciding the case before it, the
'o See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
o See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 165-201 and accompanying text.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 207-19.
See supra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
z See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
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Court appeared to be placing its imprimatur upon one of Professor
Brown's great concerns, the brushing aside by courts of statutory
formulations to do simply what they thought was right. 5 With this
imprimatur in place, it became quite easy for other courts to develop a
judicially created exception to the statutory definition of "capital assets"
separate and apart from (and totally unbounded by) the exceptions to the
definition provided for by the statute itself.
While there may have been good policy justification for this judicially
encrafted exception known as the "Corn Products doctrine," its freedom
from any statutory bounds led to the preclusion of capital asset status in
an ever-expanding set of circumstances with no end in sight as to the type
of transactions that might fall within the exception. 6 The result was
an administrative nightmare for the IRS in which a taxpayer could wait
until a transaction ended to label it capital or ordinary depending upon
whether it resulted in a gain or loss. If a transaction ended in a gain, the
IRS would be lucky if it knew enough facts to challenge the taxpayer's
capital characterization at audit. If the transition ended in a loss, the
taxpayer had the ever-expanding scope of the doctrine in his arsenal to
defend his ordinary characterization from IRS attack. The result was a,
"Heads I win, tails you lose," proposition for the taxpayer, regardless of
the merits of his case. 7
The taxpayer's ability to whipsaw the government with the Corn
Products doctrine would have ended had Congress passed the 1976
proposal that would have required taxpayers, upon purchasing a particular
asset, to file a notice with the IRS stating that an asset was being
purchased for everyday business, rather than investment purposes, or be
forever barred from claiming ordinary loss treatment on the disposition
of the asset.L8 Under this proposal a taxpayer who filed the notice
would have been precluded from claiming capital treatment were the asset
eventually disposed of at a gain, but the IRS would not have been
precluded from challenging the ordinary characterization of a loss despite
the filing of such a notice.259 The requirement of this notice, if properly
administered by computer or otherwise, could have eliminated the
z" See supra notes 33, 39 and accompanying text.
z" See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81, 238 and accompanying text. See also supra note 52 and
accompanying text (raising the question of whether Corn Products itself would have had
its capital characterization of a gain transaction challenged had it not been red-flagged on
an amended return).
See supra note 241.
"" See supra note 241.
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whipsaw problem by making it impossible for taxpayers to wait to see
whether a transaction produced a gain or a loss, confident that gains
reported as capital would rarely, if ever, be challenged, let alone be
detected as inappropriate, in the audit process.
Perhaps Congress' failure to adopt a provision akin to that before it
in 1976 justifies the Court's taking matters into its own hands in Arkansas
Best when it became clear that the Corn Products doctrine was becoming
unworkable. Indeed, one could argue that inasmuch as the Court in Corn
Products made possible the administrative problem in the first place, it
was the Court's duty in Arkansas Best to undo, as best it could, the
damage it had done in Corn Products. In its effort to accomplish this
result, however, the Court gave us an opinion that does not withstand
scrutiny and indeed might not even resolve the administrative problem
Corn Products created. 60
However, regardless of the flaws in both the Corn Products and
Arkansas Best opinions, they may simply represent the best we can
expect when a court must apply a narrowly-drafted statute to a fact
pattern that the policy evidenced by the statute indicates was unanticipat-
ed when the statute was drafted. Recognition of this problem thus leads
' Inasmuch as the Court in Arkansas Best dearly noted the administrative problems
inherent in permitting corporate stock to be treated as anything other than a capital asset,
see supra note 238 (quoting Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 222-23), and inasmuch as the
Court prefaced this notation with the statement, "Arkansas Best, which is not a dealer in
securities, has never suggested that the Bank stock falls within the inventory exclusion,"
Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 222, one could surmise that the Arkansas Best Court intended
that corporate stock could only be treated as a non-capital asset under the inventory
exception of I.R.C. § 1221(1) when it was held by a securities dealer. This inference is
reinforced by the Arkansas Best Court's apparent rejection of Booth Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962). See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 216 n.4, 222
n.7. Booth Newspapers, in fmnly establishing the "source of supply" principle that first
appeared in Western Wine and Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, see supra notes 87-93 and
accompanying text, held that corporate stock in a paper company, purchased and held by
a newspaper publisher only so long as was necessary to assure it of an adequate supply
of newsprint during a paper shortage, was not a capital asset. Nonetheless, in 1991, more
than three years after Arkansas Best was decided, the Claims Court in Circle K Corp. v.
United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 665 (1991) determined that the "source of supply" principle
survived Arkansas Best, cited Booth Newspapers with approval, and held that corporate
stock in an oil company which was purchased by a convenience store chain that sold
gasoline, to assure it of a gasoline supply during a gasoline shortage, qualified as a non-
capital asset under the inventory exception of I.R.C. § 1221(1). Circle K Corp., 23 CL Ct.
at 671-72. Regardless of whether one agrees with the Claims Court's interpretation of
Arkansas Best in Circle K, it is clear from the Circle K case that the Arkansas Best Court
did not fully succeed in its effort to resolve the administrative problem created by the
Corn Products opinion.
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to the question of how the statutory definition of a "capital asset" might
better have been drafted to preclude the problem evident in the Corn
Products and Arkansas Best opinions.
The statute could have been structured in the following manner. First,
it could have provided a general rule stating: "The term 'capital asset'
means investment property held by the taxpayer (whether or not
connected with his trade or business)." This language is taken almost
verbatim from current Code § 12216' with the limiting adjective
"investment" being added. Second, the statute could have defined
"investment property" as:
Property, transactions in which (regardless of whether ownership of that
property by the taxpayer is partially or even wholly motivated by the
desire for personal use or consumption by the taxpayer) are not
integrally related to the everyday operations of the taxpayer's trade or
business and the profits and losses which those everyday operational
transactions generate.
Third, the definition could have also contained a further refinement of the
definition of "investment property" by providing:
Under no circumstances shall the term "investment property" include
property held by the taxpayer for less than at least two years; or include
stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
be properly included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business or
property held in lieu of or as a substitute for any such property.
This refinement would have combined the original definition's holding
period' with an expanded version of the exclusion now found in
I.R.C. § 1221(1).263 As shall be noted shortly, the scope of this bright-
line refinement of or exclusion from the definition of "investment
property" could be expanded to correct egregious and longstanding errors
by courts. In such a statute, the focus would have been on the policy
behind the definition of "capital asset" with the brightline exclusions or
' I.1.C. § 1221 (West Supp. 1995).
S ee supra note 169 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 1221(1) (West Supp. 1995).
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refinements providing- guidance to courts when facing questions as to
what other property holdings qualified as "investment property."
Finally, to preclude taxpayers from being able to whipsaw the
government, as was the case under the Corn Products doctrine, the
statutory definition could also have required the taxpayer to designate an
asset as non-capital within thirty days of its purchase in order to avail
himself of ordinary treatment should the asset be sold at a loss. This
would, in effect, be an incorporation into the statute of the designation
requirement that was proposed in 1976.'" Under this provision the IRS
would not be precluded from contesting the non-capital characterization
should a loss occur, but having once designated an asset as non-capital,
the taxpayer would be forever barred from designating it as capital should
a gain ensue on its disposition.265
At first blush the foregoing suggestion might appear to lead to a more
complex statute than the current definition of "capital asset." The
brightline refinements of or exclusion from the definition of "investment
property" could be deemed an invitation for Congress to expand the
exclusions as time goes on. Ultimately, Congress might do just what this
Article advocates against: make the list endless in an attempt to cover all
conceivable transactions or property holdings. The suggestion for a
brightline exclusion, however, is not such an invitation at all. It is merely
a recognition that courts need legislative guidance, and even with it, do
not always reach correct decisions. Furthermore, in a collaborative model
of lawmaking that views law as "the product of public deliberation about
political values,"2" Congress must also have an opportunity to respond
to errant court decisions.
The only brightline exclusion or refinement that would be appropriate
in an initially promulgated statute is the one quoted above which
combines the original holding period with an expanded version of current
§ 1221(1). Additional brightline exclusions or refinements such as those
found in current § 1221(3) and (4)20 should be added by Congress only
if needed to correct egregious errors by courts. Even if a court, or even
the Supreme Court, initially reaches an incorrect conclusion with respect
to an issue, Congress should not necessarily move quickly to correct the
error. Rather, whenever appropriate, the issue should be permitted to
percolate for some time in the court system. This percolation gives courts
See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
z' See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
m I.R.C. § 1221(3), (4) (West Supp. 1995).
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time to take into account various ways in which the issue in question can
arise and how best to deal with an earlier errant court decision. Percola-
tion such as this enabled the Supreme Court in Tufts 6 to correct an
earlier errant footnote it had dropped in the Crane261 case regarding
amount realized when the principal amount of an assumed mortgage
exceeds the fair market value of the mortgaged property at the time of
mortgage assumption and transfer of the property."7 Congressional
intervention on the issue in Tufts might well have added a complex Code
provision that did not resolve the Tufts issue any better than did the Tufts
Court?'
' Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
2 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947).
27 In Crane, the taxpayer sold certain property which was encumbered by a non-
recourse mortgage of approximately $255,000. The buyer accepted the property subject
to the mortgage and transferred $2500 cash to the taxpayer/seller net of selling costs. Id.
at 3-4. Thus, the buyer and seller must have agreed that the property was worth more than
the amount of the mortgage encumbering it. Otherwise, no cash would have been paid to
the seller when the property was accepted subject to the mortgage. The Crane Court held
that the amount realized by the taxpayer on the sale included the $255,000 mortgage
amount to which the property was subject as well as the $2500 in cash netted on the sale.
Id. at 13-14. The Crane Court then added in its infamous footnote:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage,
a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the
mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a
mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage
without receiving boot. That is not this case.
Id. at 14 n.37. In Tufts, the Court corrected the erroneous impression it left in Crane that
the Crane rule might not apply when the amount of the mortgage outstanding exceeds the
fair market value of the property on the date of the sale. The Tufts Court clearly held that
when property is sold or otherwise transferred subject to an outstanding mortgage, the full
amount of the mortgage outstanding is included in the amount realized, regardless of
whether the fair market value of the property exceeds, is equal to, or is less than the
amount outstanding on the mortgage. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317.
m The author is indebted to Professor Bernard Wolfinan, Fessenden Professor at the
Harvard Law School, for remarks suggesting that Tufts' correction of the implications left
by the Crane footnote and Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.'s, 348 U.S. 426 (1955),
correction of the impression left by Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), regarding
the definition of income, see infra notes 274-81 and accompanying text, are examples of
how percolation through the court system can correct earlier judicial missteps better than
can a detailed legislative response. For Professor Wolfinan's remarks, see Tape of Session
on Formation of Tax Policy, held by the Taxation Section of the American Bar
Association (May 15, 1992) (Cassette #1, Side 2, on file with author). For a very recent
article that is apparently sympathetic to the views espoused in this Article and by
Professor Wolfinan, see James W. Colliton, Standards, Rides and the Decline of the
Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 312-14 (1995) (lamenting tax
statutes that deny courts the flexibility necessary to reach the best result in each case by
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Even with this cautionary note, Congress might choose to add
brightline exclusions to the definition of "investment property" until the
list exceeds those now found in I.R.C. § 1221. However, as long as the
exclusions remain faithful to and consonant with the underlying policy
focus of the definition of "investment property," the length of the list of
exclusions should not constitute, in and of itself, cause for concern. The
mere length of a list of exclusions (or inclusions) does not by itself make
a statutory provision complex. I.R.C. § 61(a)"7 in defining "gross
income" contains fifteen brightline inclusions;273 yet it is doubtful that
it has ever been described as a complex provision. It is simply one that
has provided a collaborative role for the courts to play in defining the
term "gross income," while simultaneously containing helpful brightlines
to guide the courts in their collaborative mission.
Indeed, the development of the definition of "gross income" through
Supreme Court litigation provides a perfect example of how percolation
of an issue through the court system can result in the correction of earlier
judicial missteps by the Court through well-reasoned opinions when the
statute itself leaves room for a collaborative role for the judiciary to play.
In 1920, the Court in Eisner v. Macomber,"4 in interpreting a predeces-
considering all the facts).
I.R.C. § 61(a) (West Supp. 1995).
r The full text of I.R.C. § 61(a) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following
items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe
benefits, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
Id.
2'4 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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sor to current § 61(a) that was similarly structured to § 61(a)2 5 defined
income as "'the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a
sale or conversion of capital assets."27 Such a limited definition would
exclude from income clear accretions to wealth such as windfalls and
punitive damage awards. Some thirty-five years later the Court recognized
that the Eisner v. Macomber definition of income was too limited in
scope and in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co."' effectively
redefined "income" to mean "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."'27
With this redefinition, the Court corrected its earlier mistake in Eisner v.
Macomber and brought the definition of "income" in line with the
theoretically pure Haig-Simons definition of "income."279 To accom-
plish this definitional change, the Court noted that it had already taxed
"the fortuitous gain accruing to a lessor by reason of the forfeiture of a
lessee's improvements on the rented property .... " Then it added
that the Eisner v. Macomber definition of income served a useful purpose
in that particular case so as to distinguish gain from capital, "[b]ut it was
not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income ques-
tions.""s Thus, the Court was able to correct its earlier misstep without
the distortion of precedent, statutory language, and legislative history that
resulted when the Arkansas Best Court tried to correct the excesses that
grew out of the Corn Products doctrine. Were more statutory provisions
drafted in a collaborative vein as this Article suggests for the statutory
' The predecessor to cunent I.R.C. § 61(a) which was interpreted in Eisner v.
Macomber was § 2(a) of the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 757 (1916). See
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 200 mll (1920). That section provided, in pertinent part:
That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed,
the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income
derived rom salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses,
trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal,
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property,
also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business
carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever ....
CI 463, 39 Stat. 756, 757 (1916) (emphasis added).
276 252 U.S. at 207.
348 U.S. 426 (1955).
mId. at 431.
See supra note 194.
20 348 U.S. at 430 (citing Helvering v. Brnin, 309 U.S. 461 (1940)).
n' Id. at 431.
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definition of "capital asset," perhaps we could have more well-crafted
and principled opinions like Glenshaw Glass and fewer distressing
opinions like Arkansas Best and Corn Products.
This collaborative approach to statutory drafting might not, however,
sit well with the practicing bar and their tax clients. Clients often wish to
know the tax consequences of a transaction before deciding to go through
with it. As a result, they often pressure their tax counsel to advise them
of the tax consequences of a contemplated transaction. Naturally, tax
counsel, when placed under such pressure from a client, feel far more
comfortable when they can answer each client's question by pointing to
statutory language that directly covers that client's anticipated transaction.
Nonetheless, even in today's world, where tax statutes are not drafted
in the collaborative manner advocated by this Article and attempts are
made in legislation to cover a wide array of specific transactions, tax
counsel still cannot answer all clients' questions with certainty. Often, the
only way a client can be made sufficiently comfortable is to obtain a
ruling from the IRS before the contemplated transaction is entered into.
Were the collaborative approach to statutory drafting advocated by this
Article adopted, concededly there would be even less certainty as to the
tax consequences of anticipated transactions. Yet the diminishment of
certainty in result is a cost worth paying to obtain the flexibility in
administration and public deliberation of values"n among governmental
branches that would flow from a collaborative system of statutory
drafting. To argue otherwise requires arguing that our legal system should
provide greater certainty of result to citizens facing tax issues than it
grants to citizens facing other legal issues.
On two occasions this author has taken refuge from the complexities
of the Internal Revenue Code to write in the area of antitrust.283 Anti-
trust is certainly an area of the law that has a significant impact upon the
planning and effectuation of commercial transactions. Not only can a
m See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
m See Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single
Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983) (contending that NFL teams should be deemed legally
incapable of conspiring with one another in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act because
they should not be deemed separate entities for Sherman Act purposes); Myron C. Grauer,
The Use and Misuse of the Term "Consumer Welfare ". Once More to the Mat on the
Issue of Single Entity Status for Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64
TUL. L. REV. 71 (1989) [hereinafter Crauer, The Use and Misuse] (elaborating upon why
single entity status should be granted to sports leagues because they produce a product
that each league team could not produce on its own).
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violation of the antitrust laws result in criminal liability,2" but victims
of antitrust violations may also recover from the perpetrators three times
the damages they incur."5 Indeed, this treble damage provision can
induce private litigants to convert mere contract claims into antitrust
actions even in situations where such conversions are not warranted by
'
4 The basic criminal provisions of the antitrust laws are found in §§ 1-3 of the
Sherman Act, which provide as follows:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., In restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000 orby
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 ifa corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000 orby
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
§ 3. Trusts in Territories or District of Columbia Illegal; combination a
felony
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the
District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any
State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared
illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1988 Supp. V 1993)
"' Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. § 15 (1988).
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sound antitrust policy 6 As a result, the fear of defending against both
criminal sanctions and treble damages under the antitrust laws could very
well inhibit the consummation of perfectly legal business transactions
even more than could uncertainty as to the tax consequences of any such
transactions.
Although it is naive to think that the IRS can ignore revenue
implications in evaluating the tax ramifications of any business or other
transaction, the IRS must temper its desire for revenue in evaluating
transactions with the recognition that if it is not perceived as fair and
even-handed, its legitimacy will be undermined and our voluntary
compliance system could suffer. Similar constraints, however, do not exist
to inhibit a private plaintiff from fashioning a novel claim for treble
damages under the antitrust laws.
Given this state of affairs, one might expect statutory specificity in
the antitrust laws to exceed that found in the tax code so that the in
terrorem effect of the threat of both criminal sanctions and treble
damages would be counterbalanced by a high degree of certainty under
the law. The opposite, however, is in fact the case. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act simply outlaws "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
,,287 Section 2 of the Sherman Act in similarly broad language
provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, ... any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
.... ,28 Perhaps even broader language is found in § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act which outlaws "unfair methods of competi-
tion."2 9 Determination of the parameters of each of these broadly
worded sections has been left to the courts, and attorneys for business
persons must advise their clients about the legality of proposed transac-
tions based upon their review of judge-made law, much of which has
been highly criticized." Although mechanisms do exist for obtaining
advance rulings from the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission as to the legality of proposed transactions, so comparatively
2' See, e.g., Grauer, The Use and Misuse, supra note 283, at 87-88.
7 See supra note 284.
28 See supra note 284.
" Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides in subsection (a)(1):
"Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1988).
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
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few rulings are ever issued that these mechanisms cannot be at all
equated with the ruling mechanism available from the IRS and the
comfort level that the tax ruling mechanism can thus provide.& '
2' The Justice Department is not authorized to give advisory opinions to private
parties. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances the Department of Justice will issue
what is known as a "Business Review Letter" indicating its present position with respect
to enforcement regarding a proposed business transaction. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 50.6
(1995). Although the Justice Department remains free to change its enforcement position
at a later date with respect to a transaction to which it has already issued a Business
Review Letter, it has never done so when the party requesting the letter fully and truly
disclosed all material and relevant facts in requesting the letter. See id. § 50.6(9). In 1987,
thirty-two Business Review Letters were issued; in 1988, eighteen; in 1989, fifteen; in
1990, nine; in 1991, seven; and in 1992, ten were issued. ANTITRUST DIVISION,
DEPARTtENT OF JusTICE, TEN-YEAR WoRKLOAD STATISTCS 1 (1993).
The Federal Trade Commission in very limited circumstances will issue an advisory
opinion with regard to a proposed business activity. See generally FTC Procedures and
Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (1995) [hereinafter FTC Rules]. For a formal
advisory opinion to be given by the Commission, the matter must either involve "a
substantial or novel question of fact or law and there ... [must be] ... no clear
Commission or court precedent" or the matter must be "of significant public interest." Id.
§ 1.1. According to Benjamin I. Berman, approximately one such formal opinion letter
is issued in the antitrust area in a six-year period. Telephone interview with Benjamin I.
Berman, Attorney Advisor to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission (Aug. 24,
1992). Additionally, the staff of the FTC may informally render advice where a formal
advisory opinion would not be appropriate. See FTC Rules, supra, § 1.1(b). According
to Mr. Berman, these staff advisory letters are not formally compiled, but FTC records
indicate that in the antitrust area: in 1987, seven staff advisory letters were issued in
1988, five were issued; in 1989, three were issued; in 1990, three were issued; in 1991,
zero were issued; and through August 23, 1992, two were issued. Telephone interview
with Benjamin I. Berman, Attorney Advisor to the Secretary of the Federal Trade
Commission (Aug. 24, 1992). The comfort level provided by these staff advisory letters
is not very great. FTC Rules, supra, § 1.3(c), provide: "Advice rendered by the staff is
without prejudice to the right of the Commission later to rescind the advice and, where
appropriate, to commence an enforcement proceeding." On the other hand, in those very
rare cases where a formal advisory opinion is given by the Commission, "[Tmhe
Commission willnot proceed against the requesting party withrespect to any action taken
in good faith reliance upon the Commission's advice,.. . where all the relevant facts were
fully, completely, and accurately presented to the Commission and where such action was
promptly discontinued upon notification of recission [sic] or revocation of the Commis-
sion's approval." Id. § 1.3(b).
With respect to tax issues, § 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 7805 (West
Supp. 1995), grants broad authority to the Treasury Department and thus the IRS to issue
rules, regulations, and rulings. Generally speaking, the National Office of the IRS will
issue an advance letter ruling to a taxpayer in any one of a number of circumstances, so
long as the issue in question is not currently being examined by the IRS for an earlier
year with respect to that taxpayer and so long as the return for the year in question has
not yet been filed. See generally Rev. Proc. 95-1, §§ 3, 5, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 15-21. A
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Nonetheless, despite the far lower degree of certainty and predictability
of results available in the antitrust field than is available in the tax field
and the draconian consequences that can flow from an adverse antitrust
judgment, the structure of our antitrust statutes and the collaborative role
that they provide for the courts in the development of the law has not had
a crippling effect on the American economy.
The point of this comparison of the structure of our tax statutes to the
structure of our antitrust statutes is not, however, to justify going to a
system of tax statutes as broadly worded as the antitrust statutes are.
Rather, this comparison has a more modest goal. It is simply to demon-
strate the questionable nature of any claim for granting citizens facing tax
issues the degree of certainty of result that tax statutes drafted in an
attempt to cover all anticipated situations seek to attain. If our economic
system can survive very broadly drafted antitrust statutes with the
collaborative role that they provide for the courts in the development of
the law, any predictions of dire consequences that would result from less
tightly drafted tax statutes must be taken with quite a few grains of salt.
The exact degree of complexity or detail that should be contained in
a tax statute, of course, cannot be subject to any hard and fast rule. As
the approach to defining "capital asset" suggested in this Article
indicates, the detail and complexity appropriate for tax statutes can be and
should be greater than that currently found in the antitrust laws. What is
"ruling" is defined as, "a written statement issued to a taxpayer or his authorized
representative by the National Office which interprets and applies the tax laws to a
specific set of facts.' 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (1995). See also Rev. Proc. 95-1, § 1.01,
1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 13 for a similar definition of "letter ruling." Although a letter ruling may
be revoked or modified unless it is accompanied by a "closing agreement," id., any
"revocation or modification of a ruling will not be applied retroactively with respect to
the taxpayer to whom the ruling was originally issued," 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(0)(5) (1995),
so long as: "(1) there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts, (ii) the facts
subsequently developed are not materially different from the facts on which the ruling was
based, (iii) there has been no change in the applicable law, (iv) the ruling was issued with
respect to a prospective or proposed transaction, and (v) the taxpayer directly involved
in the ruling acted in good faith in reliance upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation
would be to his detriment." Id. In 1987, the IRS issued 4161 Letter Rulings; in 1988,
3977 Letter Rulings were issued, in 1989, 4121 were issued, in 1990, 3372; in 1991,
2643; and in 1992, 2408 Letter Rulings were issued. Search of LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
PLR file (Aug. 23, 1993). One certainly can argue that far more transactions involve tax
implications than involve antitrust implications. Nonetheless, given the great disparity in
the number of advance rulings given in each area and the disparity in the circumstances
under which advance rulings can and will be given, persons facing legal questions in the
antitrust area usually must act without the assurances that persons facing tax questions can
obtain.
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important is not that all detail be eliminated from the Internal Revenue
Code but rather that such detail be present only as needed to assist the
judiciary in fulfilling its collaborative function in the development of
our tax law. When the detail goes beyond that and attempts to cover
all contingencies, the judiciary cannot perform its collaborative func-
tion in a principled manner, and unfortunate sagas such as the Corn
Products/Arkansas Best story will inevitably become part of our tax
culture.

